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William Appleman Williams; 
Progressive, Consensus, New Left Historian (104 pp.) 
Director: Michael S . Mayer 
This thesis explores the life and work of William Appleman Williams. It 
focuses upon the first half of Williams' career, from the completion of his 
doctoral dissertation in 1950 to the publication of his seventh book in 1969. 
Williams produced his most innovative and influential work during this 
period of his career. He attacked the United States as an imperialist power, 
deplored the inequalities and alienation bred from corporate capitalism, and 
advocated socialism. In doing so, Williams established his national 
reputation as a historian, spurred a wave of revision within the field of 
diplomatic history, and helped inform a young generation of radicals who 
came of age during the 1960s. 
Most historians associate Williams' scholarship with the "new left" of the 
1960s. In several respects this association makes sense. Williams' most 
important books appeared in the 1960s. Moreover, they contained several of 
the ideas characteristic of new left thought, and were seminal texts for new 
left scholars and radicals. However, to characterize Williams as simply new 
left is incomplete. For one thing, the core of arguments that established 
Williams as a leading new left historian did not develop out of the 1960s but 
rather were products of the initial post-war years. Moreover, what made 
Williams an interesting historian, and what makes him a particularly 
interesting historical figure, are the ways that his work intersected three of the 
premier schools of American history — progressive, consensus, and new left. 
For while Williams was an early new left historian, his work uniquely 
incorporated facets of both progressive and consensus historiography. 
Recently, a number of historians have worked to break down the 
distinctions between the "conservative" 1950s and the "radical " 1960s. 
Williams, however, is often neglected in such analyses. Instead, intellectual 
historians point to some of the premier social and cultural critics of the 1950s 
as harbingers for the radicalism of the 1960s. To exclude Williams from a 
discussion of the new left overlooks a major source of radicalism as it 
developed throughout the initial post-war decades. 
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Introduction - William Appleman Williams: 
"A Survey of the Territory"! 
In March of 1990, at the age of sixty-eight, William Appleman 
Williams died of cancer in Newport, Washington. His death marked the end 
to the prolific career of a self-professed radical historian. Over the course of 
some thirty years, Williams established himself as one of the premier 
revisionist scholars of American diplomatic history. As his obituary in The 
New York Times noted, Williams "challenged prevailing views of American 
history, deploring the United States as an imperialist power pressing its 
economic and ideological will around the world."2 Williams spent the 
majority of his career teaching at three American universities; The 
University of Oregon from 1952 to 1957, The University of Wisconsin 
between 1957 and 1968, and Oregon State University from 1968 until his 
retirement in 1986. In the process, he published eleven books, wrote dozens 
of articles, editorials, and book reviews, and trained over thirty-five doctoral 
students. 
Although Williams remained productive throughout his entire career, 
he is remembered primarily for the work that he produced in the 1950s and 
the 1960s. During these initial post-war decades, Williams made his most 
significant contributions to American historiography. In particular. The 
Tragedy of American Diplomacy, published in 1959, and The Contours of 
American History, published in 1961, were his most important, influential, 
1 This title is taken from the first chapter of The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A 
Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New 
York: Random House, 1969). 
^ Peter B. Flint, "William Appleman Williams Dies: Gadfly of Foreign Policy Was 68," The 
New York Times. Thursday. March 8, 1990, p. D25. 
1 
2 
and widely read books.3 Together these works marked the culmination of 
Williams' scholarship in the 1950s and defined the fundamental themes and 
theses that he reiterated throughout the rest of his career. Moreover, Tragedy 
and Contours established Williams' national reputation as a revisionist 
historian and offered two of the earliest "new left" interpretations of 
American history. 
In Tragedy , Williams traced the evolution of American foreign policy 
throughout the twentieth-century. He argued that since the 1890s American 
leaders, believing that the economic well-being of the United States and the 
viability of American institutions and traditions depended upon the 
perpetual expansion of international markets, aggressively pursued the 
development of what Williams described as an "informal empire."4 
Rejecting traditional forms of imperialism, the United States sought the 
economic control of diverse regions of the world. Williams contended that 
the "open door" policy, established by American leaders during the initial 
years of the twentieth-century in an attempt to establish economic access to 
the China market, defined the strategy for such control. Through 
investments and trade fostered by an alliance between the Federal 
Government and American multi-national corporations, the United States 
pursued financial domination of first Cuba and the Philippines, then China, 
Central America, and, by the end of the Second World War, of the world. 
This "imperial anti-colonialism," Williams continued, produced tragic 
consequences. The pursuit of an informal empire embodied "conflict within 
^ William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleyeland: The World 
Publishing Co., 1959); Williams, The Contours of American History (Cleyeland: The World 
Publishing Co., 1961). 
Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, p. 65. 
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and between America's ideals and practices."5 According to Williams, 
American leaders pursued foreign policy with a high degree of moral self-
righteousness. They believed that the United States' economic expansion 
would promote freedom, democracy, and self-determination throughout the 
world. The realities of American policy, however, undermined such lofty 
objectives. Williams stressed that the economic growth of the United States 
exacerbated disparities of wealth and undermined self-determination — 
particularly in underdeveloped nations. Pointing to Cuba, Central America, 
China, Mexico, and the Middle East, he argued that American diplomacy 
benefited only the elite of the developing world at the expense of the 
exploited majority. This in turn deterred freedom and democracy and fueled 
revolutionary situations that often led to violence and war. Subsequently, 
the "open door" strategy frequently demanded armed interventions by the 
United States in order to maintain the order and stability necessary for an 
economic empire. 
Furthermore, Williams contended that the United States' 
determination to control economic markets limited policy options 
concerning other industrial powers — particularly the Soviet Union. 
American leaders perceived the Soviet Union as the primary threat to the 
United States' informal empire; after all, revolutionary socialism was the 
antithesis to international capitalism. Therefore, Williams argued ever since 
the Bolshevik revolution the United States sought to undermine the power 
and influence of communist Russia. This led first to the policy of non-
recognition in the 1920s and then to the policy of containment in the years 
following the Second World War. Williams thus concluded that the United 
^ Ibid, p. 40. 
4 
States' determination to control economic markets was primarily responsible 
for the Cold War. 
In The Contours of American History, Williams departed from 
diplomatic history and presented an overview of the entire American 
experience. Contours divided the history of the United States into three 
major eras: the ages of mercantilism (1740-1828), of laissez-nous faire (1819-
1896), and of corporate capitalism (1882-1960s) According to Williams, the 
theme connecting these epochs of the American past was expansion - first 
across the North American continent through an ever-extending western 
frontier and then throughout the world with the development of an 
informal empire. 
As he did in Tragedy, Williams decried the costs of American 
expansion. He documented its impact upon indigenous peoples throughout 
the world and stressed that the growth of the United States in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries came at the expense of Native 
American cultures. Contours, however, presented a more extensive analysis 
of what Williams considered the domestic ramifications of expansion. He 
argued that throughout the eras of American history the frontier, both 
continentally and internationally, undermined the development of a true 
American community. Williams equated community with loosely defined 
forms of socialism: a "Corporate" or "Christian Commonwealth" whose 
citizens achieved "a true wholeness and identity" through communal 
responsibilities and commitments to social welfare.6 As Williams 
envisioned it, such ideals or derivatives of such ideals were displaced by an 
American capitalism based upon private property, excessive individualism, 
and corporate profits. From the initial years of the American republic 
° Williams, The Contours of American History, p. 481. 
5 
through the Cold War, the frontier nurtured capitalism in the United States; 
it provided a source of economic growth and development and thus served as 
an escape hatch through which the United States avoided confronting the 
domestic inequalities, social alienation, and spiritual bankruptcy that 
Williams deemed characteristic of American capitalist society. 
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy and The Contours of American 
History together embodied the basis of Williams' approach to "doing 
history.'7 In addition to defining the major themes of his career. Tragedy and 
Contours exemplified what Williams considered the purpose of professional 
historical scholarship. Both works developed out of his conviction that the 
historian had a responsibility to locate and explain the origins of 
contemporary problems in order to help provide solutions for the future. As 
he stated in the introduction to Contours, the historian should "help us 
understand ourselves and our world so that each of us, individually and in 
conjunction with our fellow men, can formulate relevant and reasoned 
alternatives and become meaningful actors in the making of history."s Both 
Tragedy and Contours were products of such present-mindedness. Where the 
former developed out of the assumption that contemporary American 
diplomacy was fundamentally flawed, the latter stressed the domestic 
shortcomings of American society. Both histories sought explanations for the 
essential problems that, according to Williams, plagued the United States in 
the 1950s. 
In addition. Tragedy and Contours introduced Williams' alternative 
vision for America. Where Tragedy concluded that the most important 
^ Citation from William G. Robbins' "Doing History Is Best of All. No Regrets," from 
Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman 
Williams, ed. by Lloyd C. Gardner (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1986). 
^ Ibid, p. 19. From such quotations it becomes painfully evident that Williams' work 
proceeded the women's movement. 
6 
question challenging the United States was "how to sustain democracy and 
prosperity without imperial expansion," Contours asserted that the primary 
objective of Americans should be the development of a true community.9 
Williams thus contended that the final frontier for the United States should 
be the creation of what he described as a semi-isolationist, "decentralized" 
socialism. Although he refrained from explaining how such a system could 
be achieved, or how it would work, Williams argued that the United States 
had the potential to create "the first truly democratic socialism in the 
world."lo 
From the initial publication of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 
and The Contours of American Diplomacy, Williams' approach to history 
engendered a host of criticisms. Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, from 
contemporary reviews to retrospective evaluations, in editorials, articles and 
books, his arguments were subjected to intense, often partisan, scrutiny that 
ultimately discredited much of the analysis presented in both histories. Quite 
simply, Williams' work did not withstand the test of time. 
Critics attacked Williams on a number of fronts. They characterized 
his writing style as crude and acerbic and pointed out that his narratives were 
riddled with factual mistakes and even basic spelling errors. Critics further 
accused Williams of forcing his expansionist synthesis upon history, 
neglecting evidence that ran counter to his arguments, and selectively piecing 
together information out of context in order to support his theses. Moreover, 
Williams' work was characterized as elitist and simplistic. It focused 
primarily on a small handful of policy-making leaders and ignored the 
^ Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, p. 9. 
10 Ibid, p. 488. 
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"masses" of American history; it neglected the role of foreign powers in 
determining American diplomacy; and, it depicted historical actors as 
excessively rational beings, single-mindedly committed, without doubts or 
reservations, to the extension of American borders. In addition, Williams' 
call for an American socialism was dismissed out of hand as sentimental, 
unrealistic, and lacking in conception and direction.^ 
Criticisms aside, Williams' work had a profound impact upon 
American historiography — most directly within the field of diplomatic 
history. His arguments, in particular those presented in Tragedy, spurred a 
wave of revisionism within the discipline by fundamentally challenging the 
ways in which his contemporaries perceived foreign policy and by offering 
alternative insights into the nature of American diplomacy.!2 
For one thing. Tragedy attacked conventional wisdom regarding the 
Cold War. Williams' history appeared at a time when most Americans 
accepted the bipartisan. Cold War consensus, which held that a belligerent 
Soviet state, determined to export Bolshevism abroad, initiated the Cold War 
and forced the United States to formulate the policy of containment in order 
to protect freedom and democracy throughout the world. As one critic 
H For the best critical overview of Williams' work in general see Richard Melanson's "The 
Social and Political Thought of William Appleman Williams," Western Political Quarterly. 
31 (1978), pp. 409-419. For attacks upon Williams and the "Wisconsin School" see Robert 
J. Maddox's The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1973) pp. 13-38 and Robert Tucker's The Radical Left and American 
Foreign Policy (Baltimore; John Hopkins University Press, 1971). For specific book 
reviews see Foster Rhea Dulles' "Review of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy." 
American Historical Review. (July 1959), p. 1022, Oscar Handlin's "Review of The 
Contours of American History. Mississippi Historical Review. XLVIII (March 4, 1962), pp. 
743-45, and Herbert Aptheker's review of Contours. "American Development and Ruling 
Class Ideology," Studies on the Left. 3, 1 (1963), pp. 97-105. 
l^As Williams defined revisionism in an address to the American Historical Association, 
"The revisionist is one who sees basic facts in a different way and as interconnected in 
new relationships." Cited from "Confessions of an Intransigent Revisionist," reprinted in 
A William Appleman Williams Reader, ed. by Henry Berger (Chicago; Ivan R. Dee, 1992). 
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claimed, Williams' assessment of the Cold War offered an "inverted mirror 
image" of such orthodoxy.i3 
Furthermore, Tragedy departed from "realist" interpretations of 
diplomacy that dominated scholarship in the 1940s and 1950s. Realists, in 
general, focused upon geopolitics and dismissed economic motivations in 
their assessments of foreign policy. Realist criticisms concentrated upon the 
policy making process and found American diplomacy too emotional and 
idealistic, too prone to short-sightedness, and at the mercy of cumbersome 
institutions and an under-informed public opinion. Realist scholars 
nonetheless upheld the Cold War consensus and often provided celebrated 
accounts of American leaders. Many supplemented their analyses of foreign 
policy with suggesjkions of the most effective ways to combat Soviet 
Communism. 
In upending Cold War orthodoxies and challenging realist scholarship. 
Tragedy became a seminal text for a young generation of diplomatic 
revisionists who came to prominence during the 1960s and into the 1970s. 
This new left revisionism, spearheaded by a number of Williams' graduate 
students, upheld and expanded upon the central themes introduced in 
Tragedy. In particular, Williams' assertion that economic factors played a 
primary role in foreign policy, his insights into the strategies and 
contradictions of the "open door," and his arguments pertaining to the Cold 
War became standard assumptions for new left interpretations of modern 
American diplomacy.is 
Tucker, The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy, p. 28. 
For the definitive example of "realist" scholarship see George Kennan's American 
Diplomacy: 1900-1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951). 
The most prominent of Williams' students included Walter Lafeber, Lloyd C. Gardner, 
and Thomas J. McCormick. 
9 
Although WilHams is acknowledged primarily for his impact upon 
diplomatic historiography, his work influenced scholars working in other 
fields of history. Moreover, it informed and reflected the concerns and ideals 
of the student new left. The publication of Tragedy and Contours established 
Williams as one of the academic godfathers of the new left in terms of 
diplomatic history but also within the broader range of intellectual radicalism 
that blossomed during the 1960s. The critical nature of both texts, their 
iconoclastic present-mindedness, and Williams' call for a socialist future 
provided inspiration and direction for a generation of revisionists and 
radicals who came of age in the 1960s and condemned the United States as a 
racist, imperialist power stratified by disparities of wealth and tranquilized by 
consumerism and conformity. As Clifford Solway contended in an early 
analysis of new left radicalism, "Curiously enough, Williams' great impact on 
younger radicals... isn't always clear. It shows up in footnotes to scholarly 
polemics as a kind of unstated universal acknowledgment that he was the 
builder of the house they live in."i6 
Williams' influence upon the new left, if not entirely "clear," largely 
resided in the ways that both Tragedy and Contours departed from the 
"consensus" histories of the 1950s that new left scholars found excessively 
patriotic, and recalled the work of an earlier generation of progressive 
historians. And yet, what made Williams an interesting historian, and what 
makes him a particularly interesting historical figure, are the ways that his 
work intersected all three schools of thought — progressive, consensus, and 
new left. For while Williams was an early new left historian, his work 
Clifford Solway, "Turning History Upside Down: A Radical Neo-Marxian Interpretation 
of America's Past has been Educating Many of the Young to New Historical Insights and 
Now is Poised to Infiltrate the Textbooks of the Seventies," Saturday Review (June 20, 
1970) p. 62. 
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uniquely incorporated facets of both progressive and consensus 
historiography. 
During the 1940s and 1950s, while Williams pursued graduate studies 
at the University of Wisconsin and taught at the University of Oregon, 
consensus history eclipsed the work of an earlier generation of progressive 
historians. The ascension of the consensus school marked a major transition 
in modern American historiography. Consensus historians rejected the 
fundamental themes and theses of progressive history and in the process 
introduced a new paradigm through which to understand the American past. 
Where progressive historians held that conflicts between America's 
democratic and capitalist elements — the "people" against the "interests" — 
fueled the historical record, consensus interpretations stressed the 
uniformities of a liberal tradition in the United States. They argued that a 
healthy fusion of capitalist and democratic elements devoid of fundamental 
conflicts endured throughout all eras of American his tory. 
Consensus historians, moreover, departed from progressive 
assumptions regarding the purpose of historical scholarship. Working 
throughout the initial decades of the twentieth century, progressive 
historians held that contemporary social struggles continued to divide the 
United States' economic and democratic traditions; therefore, progressive 
For the best examples of "progressive" history see Charles Beard's An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1913) Beard's The Rise of 
American Civilization: Volumes I & II (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927) and Vernon 
Parrington's Main Currents in American Thought: Volumes I & II (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, and Company, 1927). For definitive "consensus" histories see Daniel Boorstin's The 
Genius of American Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), Louis 
Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in American Political Thought (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Co., 1955) and Richard Hofstadter's The American Politcal Tradition and the Men Who 
Made It (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). 
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history, in general, explored the nature of past conflicts in order to raise public 
awareness and subsequently to provide future direction for the ultimate 
ascension of democracy in the United States. In contrast, consensus histories 
of the 1950s often reflected post-war assumptions that America, at least in 
comparison to other industrial nations, did not embody significant socio­
economic divisions or conflicts. Although there were notable exceptions to 
such generalizations, consensus history thus developed out of the presentist 
desire to preserve rather than change American institutions and traditions.^® 
New left historians of the 1960s rebelled against consensus on several 
fronts. The new left accused consensus historians of distorting the historical 
record with homogenized versions of the past that ignored political, social, 
and economic divisions and obscured the diversities of the American 
experience. In this regard, it recalled the work of progressive historians. 
Furthermore, the new left assailed the consensus school for offering 
celebrated accounts of history that were imbued with a present-mindedness 
aimed towards preserving a contemporary, capitalist status quo and countered 
with disparaging accounts of American history that critics characterized as 
"Marxist," "neo-Marxist," and "neo-progressive 
Williams was, first and foremost, an early new left historian whose 
radical theses challenged consensus history and helped define the historical 
18 For a concise expression of progressive present-mindedness see the introduction to 
James Harvey Robinson's The New History: Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical 
Outlook (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912). In regards to the consensus school see 
Boorstin's The Genius of American Politics and Conyers Read's "The Social 
Responsibilities of the Historian," American Historical Review. LV (January 1950). 
For an overview of new left historiography see the introduction to Barton Bernstein's 
Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York; Pantheon Books, 
1968). See also, Irwin Unger's "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends 
in United States Historiography," American Historical Review. LXXII (July 1967) pp.l237-
1263, Christopher Lasch's "The Cold War Revisited and Revisioned," New York Times 
Magazine (January 14, 1968) and Solway's "Turning History Upside Down." 
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revisionism and political radicalism of the 1960s. Both Tragedy and Contours 
were, in part, "neo-Marxist" and "neo-progressive." Williams' emphasis 
upon economic factors in determining diplomacy and shaping history, his 
disgust with the inequality and alienation produced by American capitalism, 
and his call for a socialist future, placed his work within the progressive and 
Marxist traditions. He shared with progressive historians, furthermore, an 
admiration for the United States' democratic elements and a tendency 
towards isolationism. Moreover, Williams identified with and was 
influenced by the two deans of progressive historiography — Frederick Jackson 
Turner and Charles Beard. 
Williams' affinity for progressive historiography was rooted in his 
mid-western background. Born and bred in a small farming community in 
Iowa, he had roots with the "people" and claimed to have learned at an early 
age the nature of American "interests." Furthermore, Williams received his 
formal training as a historian in the years following the Second World War at 
the University of Wisconsin at Madison, a center of the progressive school. 
Although the war marked the rise of consensus history, Madison remained 
an enclave of progressive scholarship. There, Williams trained under a 
number of "neo-Beardian" historians and was imbued with the spirit of 
progressive history. 
Williams developed both Tragedy and Contours within what he 
considered the essence of Beard's work. He was drawn primarily to Beard's 
approach to "doing history" and sought to emulate the progressive's attempt 
to achieve a working synthesis of the American past. The present-
mindedness that defined all of Williams' major publications in the 1950s and 
1960s reflected the work of Beard and other progressive historians. In an 
article written just prior to the publication of Tragedy, Williams, revealing 
13 
his own aspirations as a scholar, celebrated Beard as a historian who 
"committed himself to educational and pragmatic efforts designed to increase 
his fellow citizens' understanding of history's casual forces, and to instruct 
them in the use and control of such forces to build a better society."20 
Williams, like Beard, was a macro-historian with commitments to the 
present. And like Beard, he attempted to provide alternatives to 
contemporary problems by defining the "long-term generalized" patterns of 
American history. 
To characterize Williams' new left scholarship as merely "neo-
Marxist" or "neo-progressive" however, is incomplete. Although Williams 
allied his work with the progressive school, and while he was a seminal 
figure for the new left, he remained, in several respects, a consensus 
historian. Williams departed from progressive assumptions regarding the 
conflict-ridden nature of American history. Rather, his revisionism stressed 
the broad-based agreements, shared assumptions, and compromises behind 
American diplomacy and expansion. According to Williams there were no 
conflicts founding the United States' will to cultivate the North American 
continent and to extend its frontier abroad through the development of an 
informal empire. 
Williams' relation to the consensus school was important. Although 
his work, in particular Tragedy and Contours, was associated with the cultural 
and intellectual radicalism of the 1960s, neither one of these texts were a 
product of the 1960s. Rather, the major theses and themes of Williams' 
career were rooted firmly in the initial post-war years. It was during the late 
1940s and into the 1950s that he pieced together, through a number of 
William Appleman Williams, "Charles Austin Beard: The Intellectual as Tory-Radical," 
in American Radicals: Some Problems and Personalities, ed. by Harvey Goldberg (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1957) p. 106. 
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publications, the arguments presented in Tragedy and Contours. Simply, 
Williams' new left scholarship developed within an era of American 
intellectual history when consensus defined historical scholarship. 
This is a key distinction to make for it sheds light, in part, upon the 
origins of the new left. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, a number of 
historians worked to break down the distinctions between the "conservative" 
1950s and the "radical" 1960s — to locate the roots of the intellectual and 
cultural radicalism of the 1960s in the years directly following the Second 
World War. Scholars such as Richard Pells, Maurice Isserman, and Todd 
Gitlin, for instance, have located in the 1950s several sources of the new left as 
it emerged out of the old left.21 These intellectual and cultural historians 
point to some of the premier social and cultural critics of the 1950s — for 
example, C. Wright Mills, William Whyte, Dwight MacDonald, David 
Riesman, and Herbert Marcuse — as harbingers of the radicalism that erupted 
during the 1960s. Working upon the assumption that radical criticisms of the 
United States' economic, political, and diplomatic institutions did not exist in 
the initial post-war years, historians have largely ignored Williams' 
scholarship. However, to exclude Williams from a discussion on the origins 
of the new left overlooks a major source of radicalism as it developed 
throughout the initial post-war years. Williams' combination of consensus 
and progressive historiography, to a large degree, illustrates how a strand of 
the new left came together and evolved through the 1950s and into the 1960s. 
For example, see Pells' The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals 
in the 1940s and 1950s (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), Isserman's If I 
Had A Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1987), and Gitlin's The Sixties: Years of Hope. Days of Rage (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1987). 
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In all, William Appleman Williams remains a compelling subject for 
the student of history, if not so much for the enduring nature of his 
arguments, than rather because of his relation to contemporary schools of 
American historiography and post-war intellectual trends. Now approaching 
the turn of the century, an assessment of the validity of Williams' work 
approaches the anachronistic. The heated arguments that he and the new left 
sparked in the 1960s and fanned throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s no 
longer burn brightly. Therefore, the study which follows chooses not to focus 
upon Williams the historian, but to rather treat the revisionist as an 
historical figure, a subject to locate within the predominant intellectual and 
historiographical trends of the twentieth-century. 
What follows is an intellectual analysis of the first half of William 
Appleman Williams' career. It focuses upon the work that Williams did up 
until his departure from the University of Wisconsin in 1968 for Oregon State 
University. I choose this time period for a number of reasons. First, 1968 
proves a useful line of demarcation in Williams' career. Upon leaving 
Madison, his status as one of the major players in the profession diminished 
considerably. Although he went on to publish extensively throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, he achieved neither the notoriety nor the influence he did 
for the work that he produced in the 1950s and 1960s. The books Williams' 
published while at Oregon State, moreover, primarily reiterated the themes 
and theses that he developed throughout the first half of his career. A study 
of his later work becomes redundant. Furthermore, Williams' scholarship of 
the 1950s and 1960s is historically significant for its relationship to post-war 
intellectual and cultural trends. To analyze the work of these decades is to 
trace a strand in the development of the new left and to observe how it 
emerged from the initial post-war years. 
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This essay is divided into four chapters. The first chapter provides a 
biography of WiUiams' life and career, from his early years growing up in 
Atlantic, Iowa, through his departure from Madison in 1968. Drawing 
primarily from the biographical information that Williams provided in his 
own writings and in a number of interviews, this chapter highlights and 
chronicles the major events of his life. It also locates the pre-academic 
experiences that influenced Williams' career as a revisionist historian and 
introduces his relationship to the University of Wisconsin's progressive and 
radical traditions in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Chapter two provides an overview of early post-war intellectual, and, 
in particular, historiographical trends. Such background is necessary, for one 
thing, to establish the context in which Williams developed the core 
arguments of his career. This chapter integrates a number of secondary 
intellectual and cultural histories with the work of some of the premier post­
war intellectuals and the scholarship of both progressive and consensus 
historians. It argues that the war, in general, ended the intellectual radicalism 
of the 1930s and signaled the end to the predominance of progressive 
historiography. Subsequently, the war introduced a new era of consensus 
where American intellectuals accepted if not celebrated the economic, 
political, and diplomatic institutions of the United States. Through an 
exploration of the shift from progressive to consensus historiography, this 
chapter also establishes the background necessary for an analysis of how 
Williams' work related to these schools of history. 
The third chapter of this essay introduces the work Williams produced 
during the 1950s and 1960s. It traces the evolution of his major arguments 
from his first book, Russia-American Relations in 1952 to his final, major 
publication. The Roots of the Modern American Empire in 1969. By doing so. 
this chapter associates Williams' scholarship, implicitly, with the 1950s and 
subsequently traces a strand of new left radicalism through the initial post­
war decades. 
Finally, chapter four provides an analysis of Williams' work. Drawing 
upon the arguments of the previous three sections, this chapter explores 
Williams' relation to the progressive, consensus, and new left schools. 
Chapter I - Biography: The Influential Years 
William Appleman Williams was born on June 12, 1921 in Atlantic, 
Iowa, a farming community fifty miles east of Omaha, Nebraska. Williams 
recalled that he enjoyed "a good family life, a solid childhood, [and] a warm 
home."i When he was seven, however, his father, William Carleton 
Williams, a pilot in the Army Air Corps, died in an airplane crash during war 
game exercises in Oklahoma. The young Williams spent the rest of his 
childhood and adolescence with his mother, Mildred, and his grandparents, 
Maude and Porter. 
Williams often stressed the impact that an upbringing in Atlantic had 
upon his work as a revisionist historian. He recalled fondly the fact that he 
was raised, like most others in Atlantic, as a member of an extended family. 
Williams remembered his mother and grandmother as "liberated women;" 
they founded a home life that stressed hard-work, devotion, and 
perseverance. Their actions led the young Williams to conclude that "if you 
are committed to something then you act."2 A strong family served as the 
foundation for a "network of interlocking communities" that included "a 
civil community based on a political economy of agriculture, manufacturing, 
and commerce" and "a primary peer group of approximately thirty children 
that related to similar groups in play, sports, music, and the local educational 
environment."3 Atlantic, as Williams remembered it, was organized by class 
but devoid of privilege, characterized by prejudices but free from racism. 
1 William G. Robbing, "Doing History is Best of All. No Regrets," from Redefining the Past: 
Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams, ed. by Lloyd C. 
Gardner (Coryallis: Oregon State University Press, 1986) p. 4. 
2 Mike Wallace, "An Interview with William Appleman Williams," Radical Historical 
Review, v.22 (Winter 1979-1980) p. 69. 
^ Ibid, p. 69. 
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There, he studied hard, played sports, worked summers as a farm-hand, and 
learned, as he fondly recalled, "how to say no' to myself in the name of 
community."4 In all, Williams located in Atlantic the communal 
responsibilities, meaningful jobs, and intimate relationships that he would 
later consider compromised by American capitalism. 
Nonetheless, Williams discovered at a young age "the direct 
relationship between the fluctuations of the business cycle and the conditions 
of life for the farmer."^ Growing up during the 1930s he experienced 
"firsthand, the impact — economic and psychological — of depression" in the 
rural Midwest.^ He witnessed the "fear and fatigue" of downtrodden farmers 
"driven off the land by the whip of the economic marketplace," and felt the 
impact of local industries going bankrupt, never to reopen.^ Furthermore, 
the young Williams "made the realization of the international nature of 
agriculture." Working summers loading trains with exports, he "learned 
early and at first hand how the farm was tied into the world marketplace. 
Williams was a successful student and athlete. He left Atlantic at the 
age of seventeen to attend Kemper Military Academy in Booneville, Missouri 
on a basketball scholarship. In 1941, after two years at Kemper, Williams 
received a congressional appointment to the US Naval Academy in 
Annapolis, where he spent three years studying engineering and preparing 
4 Ibid, p. 265. 
^ William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the 
Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York; Random 
House, 1969) p. xxi. 
6 William Appleman Williams, "My Life in Madison," from History and the New Left: 
Madison. Wisconsin. 1950-1970. ed. by Paul Buhle (Philadelphia: Temple Uniyersity 
Press, 1990) p. 265. 
^ Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire, p. xxii. 
^ Ibid, p. xxii. 
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for a career as an officer in the United States Navy. He volunteered for the 
Navy's Amphibious Corps in 1944 and served as an executive officer on a 
landing ship in the South Pacific. A year later, during a naval engagement, 
he suffered a wound that ended his tour of combat. He was subsequently 
transferred to Corpus Christi for medical attention, recuperation, and new 
training to become a naval flier.9 
Like his years in Atlantic, both his education at Annapolis and his 
military experiences were sources of pride for Williams. He considered his 
college and military years influential to his later development as a radical 
historian. First, the military pushed Williams to strive for personal 
excellence; he recalled studying with "high-powered people" who were 
"taken very damn seriously." "We were being trained," he remembered, "to 
become captains of ships of the line, and that is no small matter. So we were 
taken seriously and lots was expected of us."io Moreover, the military taught 
Williams how best to approach confrontations; this he relied upon 
throughout his highly criticized career in academia. As he explained in an 
interview in the late 1970s: 
Over the years I've come to realize the extent to which one of the 
benefits of being trained in the Naval Academy and being in the 
regular navy, was to avoid personalizing an issue. You can, as the 
executive officer of a ship, get really chewed out by a captain if you do 
something that would even risk putting the ship in danger. There's 
very little personalization of basic confrontation....There were issues 
to be confronted and differences to be clarified and consequences to be 
accepted. But then you went from there.^i 
^ See Williams' "My Life in Madison," p.256. See also Wallace's "An Interview with 
William Appleman Williams," p. 67, and Robbins' "Doing History is Best of All. No 
Regrets," p. 4, 
Wallace, "An Interview with William Appleman Williams," p. 57. 
11 Ibid, p. 73-74. 
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In addition to learning about such "power relationships," Williams 
discovered his initial bearings as a critic of American diplomacy in the South 
Pacific. As he later explained, "we all knew Japan was defeated before the 
bomb was dropped, and saw absolutely no point in the second bomb."i2 
Although he located important aspects of his intellectual development 
in Atlantic, Annapolis, and the South Pacific, it was during his fifteen month 
service at Corpus Christi after the war that Williams "consciously became a 
radical."^3 There, he discovered the distance between American myths and 
American realities. As he pointed out in a personal memoir. Corpus Christi 
"offered a classic example of the interrelationship between large corporations 
(industrial, agricultural, and energy), the military, a reactionary religious 
hierarchy, and local businessmen and politicians — all in the context of class, 
racial, and sexual confrontations between chicanos, blacks, and whites." 
Within this setting, Williams, along with a small handful of fellow 
Annapolis graduates, became involved in the fledgling post-war civil rights 
movement. He discovered both the techniques of direct action activism and 
the reactionary potential of American society through his attempts to 
integrate the flight line and to work for "economic and social justice" for 
African-Americans .15 After receiving a "couple of beatings," an eviction 
from his apartment in the middle of the night, and constant "harassment 
from the FBI," Williams decided to end his military career and wrote a three 
page letter of resignation. The Navy rejected his efforts, and instead, he 
12 Ibid, p. 67. 
Robbins, "Doing History is Best of All. No Regrets," p. 5. 
1"^ Williams, "My Life in Madison," p. 266. 
15 Ibid, p. 266 
1^ Williams elaborated upon these events in both interviews and writings; however, he 
never provided a specific or detailed account either of his civil rights activities or the 
abuse he encountered from the F.B.I. 
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received orders of transfer to the Bikini Islands "to see if you could in fact hit 
a beach after you've bombed it with nuclear weapons.Williams suffered 
reoccurring problems from an earlier war wound on route to his new 
assignment however. Subsequently detained in San Francisco, he spent the 
final thirteen months of his military service in "various naval hospitals. 
Williams received his discharge from the Navy in 1947. After 
entertaining job offers from both Lockheed and General Electric, he decided to 
return to school and study history at The University of Wisconsin. Williams' 
desire to study history emerged from the culmination of his experiences 
growing up during the depression in the upper midwest and his service in 
the United States Navy. "It was history," he later explained, "because I really 
did want to try and make sense out of what the hell was going on — the bomb 
and all that. I figured from my education and my reading, that history was 
the best way to figure out the way the world ticked.''^^ The University of 
Wisconsin attracted Williams because, for one thing, his mother was teaching 
third grade in Wisconsin. Perhaps more important, "at that point," he 
recalled, "Wisconsin had the best history department in the country. 
Because of his limited background in history and his low CPA from 
the Naval Academy, Williams was accepted to Wisconsin on probation and 
was required to take a semester of undergraduate history courses. 
Nonetheless, he took to the study of history "like a fish to water."2i "A 
graduate student who worked thirty hours a week to supplement the CI Bill, " 
Wallace, "An Interview with William Appleman Williams," p. 68. 
18 Ibid, p. 68. 
19 Ibid, p. 70. 
20 Ibid, p. 70. 
21 Wallace, "An Interview with William Appleman Williams," p. 70. 
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Williams initially studied contemporary Russian history; however, he soon 
became frustrated by a lack of primary source material regarding the Soviet 
Union and naturally gravitated towards the study of American-Russian 
relations. Thus, he embarked upon a career as a diplomatic historian.22 
At the University of Wisconsin, Williams trained as a historian at one 
of the premier "progressive" academic institutions in America.^3 Home to 
the "Wisconsin Idea" of progressive education and government and to such 
progressive figures as historian Frederick Jackson Turner, politician Robert 
Lafollete, and economist John R. Commons, the University of Wisconsin 
served as one of the primary centers of progressive thought in the decades 
that bridged the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the years following 
the Second World War, while the consensus school buried progressive 
historiography, the University at Wisconsin became an enclave of 
progressive thought. As Paul Buhle contended in comparing the 
University's post-war scholars with East Coast intellectuals, "Madison 
intellectuals, with all their internal variety, were another species. Their 
experience was not predominately one of deradicalization," for at Wisconsin, 
"respect for [Charles] Beard's courage, his anti-state views, and his foreign 
policy criticism helped produce a major dissenting historical perspective in 
the very depths of Cold War culture."^4 
Wisconsin's post-war, progressive tradition was centered in the 
University's history department. There, such "neo-Beardian Progressive 
historians" as Merle Curti, Merril Jensen, Howard Beale, Fred Harvey 
22 Ibid, p. 71. 
23 The following discussion of The University of Wisconsin is drawn primarily from Paul 
Buhle's History and the New Left: Madison. Wisconsin. 1950-1970. both from Buhle's 
introductory history of Madison and from a number of the memoirs of "Madisonians" who 
contributed to this oral history. 
24 Buhle, History and the New Left, p. 7. 
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Harrington, and William Hesseltine offered a counterpoint to the dominant 
trends in post-war historiography. As Herbert Gutman, a near contemporary 
of Williams as a graduate student at Wisconsin, recalled; 
History was essentially past politics to these scholars. Grass-roots 
Progressives themselves, they had no patience with Stalinist 
"popular" vulgarizations. And they — all of them — had a deep 
commitment to civil liberties, to open discussion, in a time of 
liberal surrender and communist duplicity. That counted a great 
deal when so many intelligent people surrendered too easily to the 
1950s and the "New America".25 
These scholars encouraged revisionist scholarship and critical appraisals of 
American history. In the process, they trained a young generation of 
historians who went on to challenge consensus history and contributed to 
new left historiography of the 1960s. In addition to Williams and Gutman, 
historians such as Harvey Goldberg, John Higham, Warren Sussman, Gar 
Alperovitz, and Gabriel Kolko studied at the University of Wisconsin in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s. 
Madison, as Williams remembered, provided a setting for one "to be 
an intellectual and political activist in the academic and the general 
community." In addition to Wisconsin's progressive tradition, which 
remained "alive and well" in the 1950s, and the "university's commitment to 
intellectual excellence," Williams recalled other factors that contributed to his 
revisionist's world view. He stressed the intellectual activism of GIs "going 
to school [who] were knowledgeable in the way of the world and highly 
motivated" and contended that "as a group they were outspoken in the 
classroom and in seminars. They sustained an active dialogue about 
intellectual, social, and political affairs." Moreover, Williams pointed out that 
Wisconsin served as the transplanted home for several children of old-left, 
Herbert Gutman, "Learning About History," from Buhle's History and the New Left. 
p. 48. 
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East Coast parents. These "red-diaper babies", he asserted, provided "a 
powerful yeast in the Madison brew;" for, "in general they were intelligent, 
willing to work hard, and proud bearers of an activist tradition." Overall, 
Williams remembered that The University of Wisconsin "created an 
interplay between students and faculty that has been largely forgotten in all 
the talk about the silent generation of the 1950s and the activism of the 
1960s."26 
Williams supplemented the progressive education that he received at 
Wisconsin in the summer of 1948 by attending a Socialist economics seminar 
conducted by the Labour party in Leeds, England. There, he studied under 
economist A.J. Brown, "the shrewdest and toughest liberal in the English 
tradition," and "was confronted with the central problems posed by Left 
liberals and socialists coming to power for a capitalist political economy 
headed for collapse."27 The experience had a profound effect upon Williams, 
who found himself thinking for the first time "about decentralization as part 
of a program for the left."^* 
In 1950, back at Wisconsin, Williams earned his doctorate by 
completing a thesis exploring the career of Raymond Robins, an American 
progressive who worked for the Red Cross Commission in Russia during the 
Bolshevik Revolution and who urged American recognition of the fledgling 
Communist regime throughout the 1920s.29 In the years following his 
graduate work, Williams took temporary appointments at Washington and 
Jefferson College, Bard College and Ohio State University. During this time. 
This paragraph's citations are taken from Williams' "My Life in Madison," pp. 266-
269. 
27 Ibid, p. 267. 
28 Wallace, "An Interview with William Appleman Williams," p. 72. 
29 William Appleman Williams, "Raymond Robins and Russian-American Relations: 1917-
1938," Phd. Dissertation (The University of Wisconsin, 1950). 
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he expanded his dissertation into an overview of American relations with 
Russia and the Soviet Union. In 1952, he pubUshed the revised dissertation 
as his first book, American-Russian Relations: 1781-1947.30 
Williams taught at The University of Oregon from 1952 until 1957. In 
Eugene, the young academic further developed his skills as a historian by 
publishing over twenty articles for an assortment of magazines and journals. 
In 1956, moreover, he edited The Shaping of American Diplomacy: Readings 
and Documents in American Foreign Relations, 1750-1955, a large volume of 
primary documents put together for a historical series sponsored by Rand 
McNally.31 In addition, while at Oregon, Williams discovered "how to teach 
large numbers of kids in classes," and nurtured a passion for the classroom 
that became a hallmark for his work and career.32 
Williams received an offer from his graduate alma mater in 1957. 
Although hesitant to leave his tenure track position at Oregon, he accepted 
after some coaxing from Fred Harvey Harrington, one of his old mentors at 
Wisconsin. Recently appointed to the Vice-presidency of the University and 
soon to become Madison's President, Harrington hand-picked his former 
student to fill the position he vacated as the department's diplomatic 
historian. After Harrington sweetened the deal by $400, Williams accepted .33 
Back at Wisconsin, Williams embarked upon the most celebrated 
decade of his career. William Robbins described the ten years that Williams 
spent teaching at the University of Wisconsin (1957-1967) as "some of the 
William Appleman Williams, Russian-American Relations (New York: Rinehart, 1952). 
^ 1 William Appleman Williams, ed. The Shaping of American Diplomacy: Readings and 
Documents in American Foreign Relations. 1750-1955 (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 
1956). 
Wallace, "An Interview with William Appleman Williams," p. 75. 
Robbins, "Williams Appleman Williams," p. 10. 
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most creative and productive years by an American scholar. "34 In addition to 
consistently producing articles and book reviews, Williams published five 
books — Tragedy (1959), Contours (1961), The United States, Cuba and Castro 
(1962), The Great Evasion (1964), and The Roots of the Modern American 
Empire (1969) — and trained over 35 doctoral students.^s These publications 
established Williams' national reputation as a revisionist historian and 
marked his most significant contributions to American historiography. 
Furthermore, several of the graduate students Williams trained at Wisconsin 
went on to enjoy prolific careers within the field of diplomatic history. 
In addition to beginning the most fruitful period of his career, 
Williams quickly established himself as one of the leading academic figures 
for the Madison left. From the late 1950s through the end of the 1960s, in 
light of the civil rights movement, the Cuban revolution, the escalation of 
the Vietnam war, and ever-increasing student enrollments, Madison's 
progressive tradition turned increasingly radical. Williams, as one former 
student described him, "was a commanding figure" amidst the radicalism 
that blossomed in Madison during the 1960s.36 For one thing, beginning in 
1959, he served as the faculty advisor for Studies on the Left, an early new left 
quarterly published by a number of his students. Furthermore, Williams was 
active in the anti-war movement. He organized a number of town meetings 
regarding the war, lined up speakers for a radio program called "Vietnam on 
34 Ibid p. 11. 
William Appleman Williams, The United States. Cuba, and Castro (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1962); Williams, The Great Evasion: An Essav on the Contemporary 
Relevance of Karl Marx and on the Wisdom of Admitting the Heretic into the Dialogue 
about America's Future (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964). Williams prolific decade at 
Wisconsin included an expanded second edition of Tragedy published in 1962 and the 
publication of the second edition of Contours published in 1966 with a new introduction. 
36 Peter Wiley, "Radicalized History," from Buhle's History and the New Left, p. 192. 
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the Air," participated in a 40-mile march of protest to a munitions dump 
outside of Madison, and spoke at Madison's Vietnam "Teach-in" in 1965.37 
The notoriety enjoyed by Williams during his years at Wisconsin had a 
negative side as well. His work was often subject to scathing criticism. Foster 
Rhea Dulles referred to Williams as a "perverse historian"; Oscar Handlin 
deemed Contours an "elaborate hoax," "altogether farcical" and reminiscent 
of "the literary striving of unskilled freshmen;" and. Time magazine 
concluded that if Williams was in fact an influential historian then "the 
shortcomings of U.S. education derive from more important factors than 
cramped classrooms and low teacher salaries."38 
Beginning in 1960, furthermore, Williams work drew the attention of 
HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee). Suspicious of Williams 
because of Tragedy and the fact that he published in political journals such as 
Science and Society, Monthly Review, and The Nation, HUAC subpoenaed 
the manuscript for Contours. After months of being played "like a yo-yo" (as 
Williams recalled, HUAC used to issue notices to report only to cancel by way 
of telegram after he had boarded a train for Washington) he finally "settled" 
with HUAC after a ten minute appearance before the committee. Williams' 
problems did not end, however, for he soon discovered that "they sent my 
For an account of Madison's anti-war movement see Tom Bates' Rads: The 1970 Bombing 
of the Army Math Research Center at the University of Wisconsin and Its Aftermath (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1992). For a copy of Williams address to Wisconsin's "Teach-in," 
see, "Our Leaders are Following the Wrong Rainbow," published in Teach-ins: U.S.A. 
Reports. Opinions. Documents , eds. Louis Menash and Ronald Radosh (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1957) pp. 45-54. 
Foster Rhea Dulles, "Review of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy." American 
Historical Review. July, 1959, p. 1022; Oscar Handlin, "Review of The Contours of 
American History." Mississippi Historical Review. XLVIIl (March 4, 1962) pp. 743-45; 
Time magazine book review, "Loaded History: Review of The Contours of American 
History." Time. LXXVIII, No.l (July 7, 1961) pp. 68-69. 
name over to the 1RS. And the 1RS worked me over for the better part of 
fifteen years."^9 
Williams went on sabbatical to research and write The Roots of 
Modern American Empire in 1967. During this time, he settled in Newport, 
Oregon to write and often frequented the archives at Oregon State University 
in Corvallis. One year later, Williams decided to accept a position at Oregon 
State. A number of factors contributed to his decision to leave Wisconsin for 
the less prestigious halls of Oregon State. First, Williams became 
disillusioned with the "random and nonsocial violence" of the new left in 
the second half of the decade.^o The Oregon coast provided an escape from 
the daily confrontations instigated by Wisconsin's increasingly violent anti­
war movement. Williams desired, furthermore, to teach undergraduate 
students. His perpetually over-filled graduate seminars had become a burden, 
and, by 1967, he believed that he "had trained students that were as good if 
not better than I was, and so why string it out?"4i In addition, by the late 
1960s, Williams had tired of the pressures demanded by a major university 
and longed to explore other aspects of life beyond his professional career. 
Moreover, he was drawn to Oregon for aesthetic reasons. He longed for a 
chance to live, once again, on the Pacific coast and enjoy the space and 
solitude of a rural lifestyle. 
Williams' move to Oregon State signaled the end to the most 
prominent period of his career. Although he remained a prolific scholar 
while at Oregon State, his work largely reiterated the theses and themes that 
he developed during the 1950s and the 1960s. Furthermore, while Williams 
served a one year tenure as the president of the Organization of American 
Williams, "My Life In Madison," pp. 77-78. 
•40 Williams, "My Life in Madison," p. 270. 
Cited from Robbins' "Doing History is Best of Ail. No Regrets," p. 15. 
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Historians in 1980 his influence within the field diminished considerably 
after leaving Wisconsin. As he recalled, at Oregon State, academia became 
"less and less...the essence of my life." Rather, the revisionist spent the final 
stage of his career surf fishing, developing his skills as a photographer, 
playing pool, and putting "down roots in a community."^^ 
42 Ibid, p. 15 
Chapter II - Post-war Intellectual and Historiographical Trends 
Most historians associate the scholarship of William Appleman 
Williams with the cultural and intellectual radicalism of the 1960s. In several 
respects, this association makes sense. Williams' most influential books 
appeared in the 1960s and quickly became seminal texts for the new left. 
However, the core of arguments that established Williams as a leading new 
left academic did not develop out of the 1960s but rather were products of the 
initial post-war years. The major themes and theses of his career evolved 
through the work that he published during the 1950s. That evolution was all 
the more telling for, although the 1950s marked a particularly fruitful period 
in American intellectual history, they were not years often associated with 
radical thought. 
The following pages explore the predominant intellectual trends of the 
1950s in order to provide background for an analysis of Williams' work. Such 
background is necessary for a number of reasons. First, this chapter 
establishes the intellectual context of Williams' early scholarship. Recent 
historians have found continuity between the 1950s and the 1960s. They have 
located the intellectual origins of the new left in the initial post-war years; 
however, most intellectual and cultural historians have overlooked 
Williams in such analyses. The pages that follow, therefore, highlight the 
post-war intellectual environment in order to set up the next chapter that, by 
examining Williams' major arguments, traces the origins of new left 
radicalism through the 1950s and into the 1960s. Furthermore, this 
background chapter is essential for an analysis that, in part, links Williams' 
revisionism to the 1950s — particularly in regard to the professional historical 
scholarship of that decade. Therefore, after sketching the broad intellectual 
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trends of the 1950s, this chapter focuses upon the respective rise and decline 
of consensus and progressive historiography after the Second World War and 
explores the central tenets of these two schools of thought. 
Intellectual and cultural historians have concluded that the Second 
World War marked a period of transition in American intellectual thought. 
Although there are exceptions to such generalizations, historians argue that 
throughout the years following the war, American intellectuals rejected Karl 
Marx, Charles Beard, the far left, and progressive historiography. Instead, the 
post-war years witnessed the rise of "consensus" intellectual scholarship. A 
departure from turn of the century progressivism and depression-era 
radicalism, consensus, or post-war liberal, thought largely embraced 
American economic, political, and diplomatic institutions, programs, and 
policies.! 
Consensus thought embodied a number of fundamental assumptions 
shared by American intellectuals in the years following the war. First, 
consensus intellectuals rejected radical thought. As Daniel Bell described it, 
the post-war years witnessed the "end of ideology."2 Throughout the 1950s, 
intellectuals once allied with the left during the 1930s dismissed Marxist 
1 For a summary of post-war intellectual and cultural trends see Richard Pells' The 
Liberal Mind in A Conservative Age (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 
Godfrey Hodgson's America In Our Time: From World War II to Nixon. What Happened and 
Why (New York: Vintage Books, 1976) chapter 3, Maurice Isserman's If I Had a Hammer: 
The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987), 
Norman Graebner's The Age of Doubt: American Thought and Culture in the 1940s (Boston: 
Twayne Publishers, 1991), Larry May's Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age 
of the Cold War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), John Patrick Diggins' 
The Rise and Fall of the American Left (New York: W.W Norton and Co., 1992) and Stephen 
J. Whitfield's The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1991). 
2 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the 1950s (New 
York: Harper and Row, I960)-
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ideologies that "had lost their truth and their power to persuade."3 A 
number of factors contributed to this development. Stalin's show trials of 
the 1930s, the great purges, the Nazi-Soviet Non Aggression Pact, and Soviet 
expansion into Eastern Europe after the war discredited Russia's Communist 
party among intellectuals. Furthermore, the Holocaust, Nazi aggression, and 
Stalinism all shook intellectual faith in the power of the masses. Russian 
Communism and German Fascism together gave rise to skepticism among 
American intellectuals in regards to powerful national governments and 
Utopian political philosophies. In all, as Bell concluded, "For the radical 
intellectual who had articulated the revolutionary impulses of the past 
century and a half, all this has meant the end to chiliastic hopes, to 
millenarianism, to apocalyptic thinking — and to ideology. For ideology, 
which was once the road to action, has come to be a dead end."^ 
Moreover, the threat of international communism after the war led 
most intellectuals to support their nation's involvement in the Cold War. 
Consensus thought upheld the standard assumptions of Cold War orthodoxy 
— in particular, that the Soviet Union determined to export communism 
abroad, that this posed the main threat to America and the free world, and 
that it was the responsibility of the United States to counter and contain the 
expansion of international communism.^ 
3 Ibid, p. 402. 
Ibid, p. 393. Although several American intellectuals moved away from past 
commitments to Marx after the war, this trend was predominant amongst the "New York" 
intellectuals, primarily those associated with Partisan Review such as James Burnham, 
Dwight MacDonald, Phillip Rahv, William Phillips and Lionell Trilling. For a discussion 
of the "deradicalization" of such thinkers see James Gilbert's Writers and Partisans (New 
York: Wiley Co., 1968) and Terry Cooney's The Rise of the New York Intellectuals: Partisan 
Review and Its Critics (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986). 
5 For the most definitive expressions of Cold War orthodoxy see George Kennan's "The 
Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs XXV. No. 4 (July, 1947) pp.566-82. See also 
Kennan's Memoirs: Volume I (Boston: Little and Brown Co., 1967) chapters 9-15, Walter 
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In addition, a number of domestic factors shaped post-war thought. 
The exponential economic growth and technological modernization spurred 
by the war discredited Marxist prophecies of an impending proletarian 
revolution brought on by the internal contradictions of capitalism. The 
liberating features of the Second World War and post-war prosperity 
furthered the belief that a mixed, expanding economy raised standards of 
living, leveled class tensions, and fostered equality. Consensus intellectuals 
thus accepted the central tenets of the New Deal and the Fair Deal. They held 
that the role of the federal government was to provide a limited welfare state 
and to promote economic growth. As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. declared, 
"Keynes, not Marx, is the prophet of the new radicalism. 
Moreover, the legacies of communism and fascism bred new respect 
among intellectuals for the United States' political institutions and traditions. 
As opposed to the single-party state, the gulag, and the concentration camp, 
American intellectuals upheld the virtues of civil liberties, democratic 
pluralism, and due process of law.^ 
In all, anti-communism, containment, as well as a reverence for 
America's political system and free-enterprise economy characterized post­
war, consensus thought. As Richard Pells has contended, in adopting 
consensus views, several American thinkers became "celebrants of their 
native land."® Intellectual standard bearers such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 
Lippman's The Cold War (New York: Harper and Row Co., 1947) and James Bumham's The 
Struggle for the World (New York: J. Day Co., 1947). 
^ Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1949) p. 183. 
^ In addition to Schlesinger's The Vital Center and Bell's The End of Ideology see Seymour 
Lipset's Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1959), David 
Potter's People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1954) and John Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent Society 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958). 
^Richard Pells, The Liberal Mind in A Conservative Age, p. 31. 
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Daniel Bell, Lionell Trilling, Seymour Lipset, and Reinhold Niehbuhr moved 
away from radical thought and enlisted in the Cold War. In front of the 
classroom and within the pages of books and articles published in journals 
and magazines as diverse as Time, Commentary, Fortune, Partisan Review, 
and The New Republic, these thinkers warned of the evils of Soviet 
Communism and espoused an "American way of life." They sought to 
prevent "the totalitarian infiltration of Western political life."^ In doing so, 
they became spokesmen for post-war American liberalism and defenders of 
the political and economic institutions of the United States. 
While many intellectuals emerged from the Second World War as 
advocates for an American way, the war did not eliminate critical scholarship 
in the United States. Turning away from economic, political, and diplomatic 
criticisms, intellectuals focused upon cultural and social issues to produce the 
most disparaging analyses of America in the post-war era. Of course, critical 
analyses of modern culture existed well before the 1940s. However, the social 
and cultural changes facilitated by the war led to a resurgence of this type of 
scholarship. Writers such as Dwight MacDonald, William Why te, David 
Riesman, C. Wright Mills, and Herbert Marcuse, leveled their criticisms of 
the United States at American middle class values, and the conformity and 
mindless consumerism bred from post-war prosperity. These thinkers 
decried the increasing lack of an aesthetic quality of life in the United States; 
they concluded that the rise of white collar jobs and the proliferation of the 
American suburb, together with the material comforts of automobiles, 
televisions, washing machines, and lawn mowers, left Americans alienated, 
"other-directed," and devoid of compelling, high culture.^o As Maurice 
9 Ibid, p. 100. 
For example see David Riesman's The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1950), William Vvnyte's The Organization Man (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), 
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Isserman declared, "In the 1930s mass culture was denounced as the opiate of 
the working class; in the mid-1950s the debate of mass culture had become the 
opiate of formerly radical intellectuals. 
Consensus thought not only characterized ways in which intellectuals 
perceived contemporary institutions, events, and policies. It also marked 
new interpretations of the American past. As post-war intellectuals moved 
away from Marx and the left, American historians, in general, dismissed 
Charles Beard and progressive historiography. Throughout the 1940s and 
into the 1950s, a young generation of consensus historians challenged the 
premises of progressive history, introduced new interpretations of the 
American experience, and in the process, redefined the purpose of 
professional historical scholarship. The defeat of fascism, the threat of 
communism, and the apparent vitality of American institutions led 
historians to reject the assumptions of progressive thought and instead to 
offer historical "explanations of America's political ingenuity, economic 
success, and social stability in the 1950s."12 
Progressive historians such as Beard, Frederick Jackson Turner, 
Vernon Parrington, and James Harvey Robinson dominated the field of 
history throughout the first half of the twentieth-century. Together, Turner's 
"The Significance of the Frontier in American History" and Beard's An 
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution established the fundamental 
C. Wright Mills' White Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), Dwight 
MacDonald's Against the American Grain (New York: Random House, 1952) and Herbert 
Marcuse's Eros and Civilization (New York: Vintage Books, 1955). 
11 Isserman, If I Had a Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left. 
p. 98. 
Richard Pells, The Liberal Mind in A Conservative Age, p. 162. 
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themes and theses of progressive historiography.13 Turner's "frontier thesis", 
first presented to the American Historical Association in 1893, held that 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries an ever-extending 
frontier across the North American continent distinguished the United States 
from its European antecedents. The frontier nurtured America's unique 
traditions and institutions. Where East Coast cities harbored the aristocratic, 
commercial, conservative, and manufacturing characteristics reminiscent of 
the "Old World," "the frontier settlement advanced and carried with it 
individualism, democracy, and nationalism."14 Turner clearly allied himself 
with the later, as he enthusiastically concluded: 
The result is that to the frontier the American intellect owes its 
striking characteristics. That coarseness and strength combined 
with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of 
mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful grasp of material 
things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great ends; that 
restless, nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for 
good and for evil; and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which 
comes with freedom — these are the traits of the American 
frontier. 
Similar to Turner's work on the frontier, Charles Beard's An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution stressed the historical divisions between 
America's "personalty" or financial class, "the holders of state and 
continental securities," and the "realty" class made up primarily of small, 
debt-ridden farmers of western regions.!^ While Turner focused upon the 
frontier. Beard's most recognized contribution to progressive historiography 
examined the American constitution. Beard argued that the primary 
Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," 
American Historical Association, Annual Report for the Year 1893. (Washington, 1894). 
Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1913). 
Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," p. 35. 
15 Ibid, p. 37. 
Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constition. p. 23. 
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motivation behind the adoption of a national constitution came from a 
personalty class that felt its property rights were left unprotected by the 
Articles of Confederation. Thus Beard contended that the constitution was 
essentially "an economic document," written and ratified by America's 
financial elite in order to maintain power and avoid "the attacks of leveling 
democracy."!^ 
Where Turner's work on the frontier and Beard's economic 
interpretation of American history established the primary themes of 
progressive history. Beard's The Rise of American Civilization and Vernon 
Parrington's Main Currents in American Thought provided the most 
extensive presentation of what David Noble has described as "the progressive 
paradigm."18 Both of these epic works, each a two volume overview of the 
entirety of American history, held that from colonial times through the 
guilded age and into the twentieth century perpetual conflicts fueled the 
development of the United States — conflicts between Jeffersonian democrats 
and Hamiltonian aristocrats, the feudal South and the capitalist North, the 
yeoman farmer and the urban financier, the laborer and robber baron, 
isolationist and imperialist. The Rise of American Civilization and Main 
Currents in American Thought assumed, in accordance with the frontier 
Ibid, pp. 152-188. 
1^ Charles and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization: Volumes 1 & II (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1927); Vernon Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought: 
Volumes I & II (New York: Harcout, Brace and Company, 1927)- David Noble has published 
extensively on both progressive and conensus historiography. For example, see Noble's 
The End of American History: Democracy. Capitalism, and the Metaphor of Two Worlds in 
Anglo-American Historical Writing. 1880-1980 (Minneapolis: The University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985)- See also Noble's Historians Against History: The Frontier Thesis 
and the National Covenant in American Historical Writing since 1830 (Minneapolis: The 
University of Minnesota Press, 1965), The Progressive Mind: 1890-1917 (Chicago: Rand 
and McNally, 1971), and, "The Reconstruction of Progress: Charles Beard, Richard 
Hofstadter, and Postwar Historical Thought," from Larry May's Recasting America: Culture 
and Politics in the Age of the Cold War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989)-
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thesis and the economic interpretation of the constitution, that throughout 
all eras of American history forces representing an indigenous democracy 
battled with a transplanted European capitalism for predominance in the 
United States. 
However, where Turner and Parrington bemoaned the passing of the 
frontier and the demise of rural democracy in light of industrialization. 
Beard's progressivism looked optimistically to the future and the ultimate 
ascension of the democratic ideal in the United States. For Beard, history was 
progress. He conceded that capitalist elements had thwarted the development 
of democracy throughout the past and that industrialization had produced 
inequalities and suffering. However, with reform and rationalization, 
claimed Beard, the American industrial order promised a future where "an 
invulnerable faith in democracy...[would rise] to a position of commanding 
authority" and that the "undistinguished masses" would enjoy "an ever 
wider distribution of the blessings of civilization — health, security, material 
goods, knowledge, leisure, and aesthetic appreciation, 
Assuming that contemporary democracy still struggled against a 
capitalist elite. Beard contended that the purpose of the historian was to 
explore the nature of past conflicts in order to explain the fundamental 
problems of the present and provide direction toward a democratic future. 
Such present-mindedness became an integral component of the progressive 
paradigm. "The distinguishing mark" of the progressive historian, wrote 
Morton White, was "an anxiety to convert the present into a more decent 
future" for "their study of history was not motivated by nostalgia for the past, 
but rather concern for the future."2" James Harvey Robinson, a colleague of 
Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, p. 800. 
20 Morton White, Social Thought in America (New York: Viking Press, 1949) pp. 50-52. 
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and co-author with Beard, described the present-mindedness of progressive 
historiography. 
Society is to-day engaged in a tremendous and unprecedented effort 
to better itself in manifold ways. Never has our knowledge of the 
world and of man been so great as it now is; never before has there 
been so general good will and so much intelligent social activity as 
now prevails. The part that each of us can play in forwarding some 
phase of this reform will depend upon our understanding of 
existing conditions and opinion, and these can only be explained, as 
has been shown, by following more or less carefully the process that 
produce them. We must develop historical-mindedness upon a far 
more generous scale than hitherto, for this will promote rational 
progress as nothing else can do.^i 
Overall, progressive historiography reflected the historical 
environment in which it developed. Progressive history, as John Higham 
contended, "gave a sense of depth to the social struggles which historians in 
the early twentieth century observed all around them."22 Stressing the 
divisions and conflicts of the past while allying themselves with America's 
democratic elements, progressive historians sought, through professional 
historical scholarship, to help reform the present. 
By the end of World War II, American historians began to reject the 
progressive paradigm. Scholars such as Richard Hofstadter, Louis Hartz, and 
Daniel Boorstin dismissed progressive historiography and focused their 
interpretations of American history not upon conflict, but rather, on 
consensus.23 Where progressive historians accented the tensions of the past. 
James Harvey Robinson, The New History: Essavs Illustrating the Modern Historical 
Outlook (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912) pp. 23-24. 
22 John Higham, "The Cult of the American Consenus," Commentary XXVIl (February, 
1959) p. 94. 
23Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New 
York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in American Political 
Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1955); Daniel Boorstin, 
The Genius of American Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953). 
41 
consensus historians "emphasized the enduring uniformities of American 
life, the stability of institutions, the persistence of a national character" and 
argued that the history of the United States embodied a healthy fusion of 
capitalist and democratic elements.^^ In the introduction to his The 
American Political Tradition, published in 1948, Richard Hofstadter defined 
the post-progressive era of American historiography. As he contended, "the 
fierceness of the political struggles" chronicled by progressive historians "has 
often been misleading." Rather, he continued, throughout the American past 
"the major political traditions have shared a belief in the rights of property, 
the philosophy of economic individualism, the value of competition; they 
have accepted the economic virtues of capitalist culture as necessary qualities 
of man."25 
The definitive example of consensus history was the work of Daniel 
Boorstin — in particular, his The Genius of American Politics. Boorstin based 
his history upon the curious fact that the United States "has never produced" 
a great political philosopher and has never embraced a Utopian, political 
philosophy. Instead, he located consensus in the American tradition of 
"giveness." Boorstin's understanding of "giveness" embodied three central 
characteristics. First, he contended that American values such as liberty, 
equality, and democracy were "in some way automatically defined...by certain 
facts of geography or history peculiar to us."26 Second, "giveness" assumed 
that these values were implicit in the institutions of the United States. And 
third, these factors were responsible for "the continuity and homogeneity" of 
John Higham, "Beyond Consensus: The Historian as Moral Critic," p. 613. 
Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, p. viii. 
Daniel Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics, p. 8. 
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American history, for "giveness" embodied the values common to all 
Americans.27 
Boorstin located consensus in "the giveness" of the United States' 
traditions, values, beliefs, and institutions; similarly, Louis Hartz identified 
an all encompassing liberalism that defined American history. Hartz, 
another consensus historian of the 1950s, contended that because the United 
States lacked a feudal past, it thus remained impervious to both socialism 
("the hidden origin of socialist thought...is to be found in the feudal ethos") 
and to fascism. Instead, Americans developed "a liberal way of life."28 Hartz 
loosely, yet persistently, equated American liberalism with Lockean notions 
of individuality and private property, democracy, and middle class prosperity. 
Like Boorstin, he concluded that there had been no fundamental conflicts in 
American history. However, Hartz's assessment of "Americanism" was less 
than salutary. Rather, he pointed out that such a liberal tradition bred 
conformity and unanimity of opinion that at times approached tyranny. He 
thus concluded that, "Ironically, liberalism is a stranger in the land of its 
greatest realization and fulfillment. "29 
Despite Hartz's skepticism, most consensus histories reflected the 
broader tendencies of post-war intellectuals to praise American values and 
beliefs. For one thing, consensus thinkers such as Boorstin, Seymour Lipset, 
David Potter, and Oscar Handlin praised America's "liberal tradition.''^" 
Ibid, p. 9. 
Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, pp. 6-9. For another example of a 
skeptical, consensus history see also Richard Hofstadter's The Age of Reform: From Brvan 
to FDR (New York: Vintage Books, 1955). 
29 Ibid, p. 11. 
See Lipset's Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. David Potter's People of Plenty: 
Economic Abundance and the American Character. Oscar Handlin's The Uprooted: The Epic 
Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1951), and Boorstin's The Americans: The Colonial Years (New York: Random House, 
1958). 
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"Giveness," according to Boorstin, was synonymous with "genius." It 
fostered pragmatic, conservative, and stable values and institutions. Such 
ideals and traditions insulated Americans from the emotionalism and 
"idolatry" at the root of European political philosophies such as nazism, 
fascism, and communism. 
Moreover, consensus historians "displayed," as John Higham pointed 
out, "attitudes often found in conservative quarters."3i Where progressive 
historians, in general, allied themselves with "the common man" and the 
democratic elements of the past, consensus historians reappraised the virtues 
of "mass democracy."32 For example, post-war biographies of the democratic 
heroes of progressive scholarship — such as Nathaniel Bacon, Roger 
Williams, and Andrew Jackson — stressed the lawlessness, intolerance, and 
demagoguery of these figures.33 Moreover, traditional "enemies" of 
progressive history — the John Winthrops, Alexander Hamiltons, and John D. 
Rockefellers — received more sympathetic interpretations by consensus era 
historians.34 Indeed, although there were exceptions, post-progressive 
historians often scorned America's "populist" elements while embracing the 
more "conservative" figures of the past. 
As Jesse Lemisch claimed, by offering "celebrations of the past," 
consensus historians formulated their historical interpretations with a 
John Higham, "Beyond Consensus: The Historian as Moral Critic," p. 613. 
32 Ibid, p. 613. 
33 Ibid, pp. 613-14. For examples of such "conservative" scholarship see Allen Simpson's 
"How Democratic Was Roger Williams," William and Mary Quaterly XIII (January 1956) 
and Wilcomb E. Washburn's The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in 
Virginia (Chapel Hill, 1957). 
34 See, Edmund S. Morgan's The Puritan Dillema: The Story of John Winthrop (Boston: 
Little Brown, 1958), Broadus Mitchell's Alexander Hamilton. Youth to Maturity. 1755-
1788 (New York: Macmillan 1957), and Allan Nevins' Study in Power: John D. Rockefeller. 
2 volumes (New York: Scribner, 1953). 
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considerable degree of present-mindedness.^s However, consensus history, in 
general, rejected progressive assumptions that history should be studied in 
order to facilitate contemporary change; instead, the presentism of consensus 
historians developed out of the desire to preserve American institutions and 
traditions, particularly in light of the apparent threat of Soviet Communism. 
As Boors tin (a Marxist in the 1930s) described such consensus methodology 
while testifying before HUAC in 1953; "I do feel the most effective way to fight 
communism is — the one effective way in which I may have the competence 
is by helping people to understand the virtues of our institutions and their 
special values as these emerged from our history, and I have tried to do 
that."36 
In his presidential address to the American Historical Association in 
1950, Conyers Read elaborated upon such presentist motivations. Entitled, 
"The Social Responsibilities of the Historian," Read's paper argued that the 
post-war years marked "an age of transition from laissez-faire to a planned 
society in which we will either be ruled by a dictatorship or by a government 
democratically controlled." Read called upon historians to dedicate 
themselves to the latter. He contended that, "Total war, whether it be hot or 
cold, enlists everyone and calls upon everyone to assume his part. The 
Historian is no freer from this obligation than the physicist." Read urged 
historians not to dwell upon past tensions and divisions but instead to 
"recognize certain fundamental values as beyond dispute. For these values 
Jesse Lemisch, On Active Service in War and Peace: Politics and Ideology in the 
American Historical Profession (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1975) 
Cited from Lemisch's On Active Service in War and Peace, p. 67. 
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we must define as precisely as may be and must be defended against all 
assaults, historical or otherwise. 
In sum, consensus historians challenged the themes, theses, and 
purposes of progressive history. Where progressive historians saw conflict, 
consensus historians found cohesiveness; where progressive historians 
stressed the divisions bred by economic and democratic interests, consensus 
historians posited a unique, all-embracing American liberalism; where 
progressive historians allied themselves with mass democracy, consensus 
historians distrusted mass movements; and, where progressive historians 
trumpeted the need for change and reform, consensus historians often sought 
the preservation and perpetuation of American institutions. Such differences 
resided in the fact that both progressive and consensus historiography 
reflected the particular historical moments that produced them. As Richard 
Pells argued, after World War II, "when perpetual social strife no longer 
seemed quite so laudable," American historians "reinforced the notion that 
the current vitality of the United States flowed from its distinctive 
environment and traditions."3* While some consensus historians found the 
continuities of American history repugnant, most took pride in their nation's 
past. 
In all, the early post-war years marked a time of consensus, of 
conservative liberalism, and of anti-communism. Nonetheless, historians 
have pointed out that despite rejections of Marx and Beard, the old left, and 
progressivism, the 1950s fostered the origins of new left radicalism. Just 
below the surface of the predominant intellectual and cultural trends of the 
Conyers Read, "The Social Responsibilites of the Historian", American Historical 
Review. LV (January 1950) p. 282. 
38 Richard Pells, The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age, p. 148. 
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1950s lurked an uneasiness with the American way, misgivings about 
consensus, and anxieties about the Cold War. By the 1960s, such 
undercurrents blossomed into a new left which challenged the assumptions 
upheld by the leading post-war intellectuals. Most historians locate the 
origins of the new left within the work of radical nomads such as Dwight 
MacDonald and C. Wright Mills. They argue, furthermore, that the new left 
emerged as a product of the social and cultural portraits constructed by 
William Whyte, David Riesman, and Herbert Marcuse. While historians 
concede that such radical stirrings were part of the 1950s, they maintain that 
the early post-war years nonetheless lacked radical attacks upon American 
political, economic, and diplomatic institutions. As Richard Pells concluded, 
"nothing better illustrates the intimate connection between the two decades 
that the extent to which the radicalism of the 1960s was primarily cultural 
rather than political."39 However, such conclusions overlook the work of 
William Appleman Williams. 
39 Ibid, p. 403. 
Chapter III - The Work of A Revisionist Historian 
Although neglected by most intellectual historians of the post-war era, 
William Appleman Williams produced his most important and influential 
work during the 1950s and 1960s. Between the publication of his first book, 
Russian-American Relations, in 1952 and The Roots of the Modern American 
Empire in 1969, he wrote 4 books, 37 articles, 7 book reviews and edited a two 
volume series on the history of American diplomacy. With these 
publications, Williams developed the fundamental ideas of his career. He 
established his national reputation as a radical, revisionist historian by 
identifying and attacking the United States as an imperialist power, by 
deploring the inequalities and alienation bred from corporate capitalism, and 
by advocating socialism. 
What follows is a survey Williams' revisionism as it developed during 
the initial post-war decades. This is not an analytical chapter. Rather, the 
following pages introduce Williams' major arguments as they appeared 
chronologically from 1952 to 1969. In doing so, this chapter illustrates the fact 
that his scholarship was, in large part, a product of the 1950s. It traces, 
moreover, the evolution of a strand of new left radicalism through the 
"conservative" 1950s and into the "radical" 1960s. Furthermore, these pages 
provide an overview of Williams' work that is necessary for an analysis that 
places Williams within each of the progressive, consensus, and new left 
traditions of American historiography. 
William Appleman Williams' professional career began in 1950 with 
the completion of his doctoral dissertation, "Raymond Robins and Russian-
47 
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American Relations: 1917-1938.The study examined the career of Robins, a 
progressive politician who served as a member of the Red Cross Commission 
in Russia during the Bolshevik revolution and advocated American 
recognition of the Soviet Union during the 1920s. In this work, Williams 
introduced a core of arguments that, once refined and developed, he 
presented in his first book, American-Russian Relations: 1781-1947.^ 
American-Russian Relations argued that throughout the nineteenth 
century the United States and Russia shared amicable relations. This changed 
however during the 1890s when the United States attempted to establish the 
"open door" in China. According to Williams, American leaders deemed 
Russia as "the principal enemy" to their plans of establishing economic access 
to the Far East.3 Such an assumption was "basically unsound" he explained, 
for "at no time" did Russia present "serious" competition "in the markets of 
either China or Manchuria." Anti-Russian sentiments, moreover, led the 
United States to support Japan in the Russo-Japanese war. This decision 
resulted in the "failure of a policy designed to pre-empt Asia as an American 
market," for the war upset the balance of power in the region by expanding 
Japanese influence in Manchuria and catapulting Russia towards revolution.^ 
Williams concluded that a combination of "tragic" elements — America's 
determination to establish economic control of Asian markets and an 
unwavering "Russophobia" among presidential administrations — guided 
American-Russian relations into the twentieth-century. 
^ William Appleman Williams, "Raymond Robins and Russian-American Relations: 1917-
1938, Phd. Dissertation (The University of Wisconsin, 1950). 
2 William Appleman Williams, Russian-American Relations (New York: Rinehart, 1952). 
3 Williams, American-Russian Relations, p. 42. 
4 Ibid, p. 47. 
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Any chance for the United States to develop a constructive relationship 
with Russia, he continued, was lost in 1917. According to Williams, the 
Bolshevik Revolution turned anti-Russian sentiments into "a bitter 
antagonism toward Soviet-Russia.First of all, foreign policy makers — in 
particular, Woodrow Wilson, Charles Evans Hughes and Herbert Hoover — 
shared a common "disdain for the economic system of the Soviet Union" and 
condemned Bolshevism as morally reprehensible.^ Furthermore, these 
leaders continued to perceive the Soviet Union as the primary threat to the 
United States' economic interests in China. This resulted in the Wilson 
administration's attempt to destroy the Bolshevik regime by supporting 
Russia's counter-revolutionary forces and committing American troops to 
Siberia. Failing to undermine the consolidation of communist power, 
Wilson adopted a policy of non-recognition — the hallmark of American-
Russian relations throughout the 1920s. 
Although the United States formally recognized the Soviet Union in 
1933, Williams still regarded America's Soviet policies throughout the 1930s 
as "tragic." He argued that the Roosevelt administration never sought 
"meaningful collaboration with the Soviet Union."^ According to Williams, 
Roosevelt could have, by strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with 
the Soviets, countered the expansion and aggression of Japan and Germany in 
the years leading up to the Second World War. However, blinded by ideology 
and convinced that the Soviet Union remained the primary threat to the 
open door in China, American leaders failed to assert the leadership missing 
among allied powers during the rise of fascism in the 1930s. 
5 Ibid, p. 177. 
6 Ibid, p. 229. 
^ Ibid, p. 254. 
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In the final chapter of American-Russian Relations, Williams analyzed 
the diplomacy of the Second World War and the initial years of the Cold 
War. He found the Roosevelt administration guilty of not fully cooperating 
with Stalin during the war. By promising, yet not providing either a second 
front or a post-war loan, Roosevelt exacerbated Soviet suspicions of the West. 
Both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, furthermore, failed to 
acknowledge the Soviet Union's "minimum security demands" in Eastern 
Europe.® Instead of granting Stalin a "sphere of interest" on his western 
border, the United States, irrationally fearing the spread of communism, 
resorted to the policy of containment. This, Williams concluded, capped a 
half-century of inflexible, disingenuous, and ultimately, ineffective policies 
towards Russia. 
In all, Russian-American Relations introduced a core of arguments 
that Williams elaborated upon throughout his career. First, he stressed the 
primacy of economic factors in determining foreign policy. Williams located 
the origins of modern diplomacy in the 1890s when American leaders 
formulated the "open-door" policy as a means to stimulate a depressed 
economy through exports. Subsequently, the United States pursued foreign 
policies in order to sustain and expand American economic activity. 
Therefore, the inter-war period, contrary to historical orthodoxy, was not a 
time of isolationism; rather, expansion through the pursuit of international 
markets characterized American diplomacy between the wars. This 
significantly restricted negotiations with the Soviet Union prior to, during, 
and following the Second World War. Finally, Williams concluded that the 
extension of American economic interests throughout the world forced the 
issues that led to the Cold War. 
^ Ibid, p. 263. 
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During the 1950s, Williams explored the theses introduced in 
American-Russian Relations in greater depth. Although the twenty-two 
articles that he published throughout these years ranged from "Reflections on 
the Historiography of American Entry into World War I" to "The Historical 
Romance of Senator Neuberger's Election," Williams' revisionism 
developed around three basic themes First, he examined the economic and 
ideological foundations of modern American diplomacy as they emerged in 
the 1890s and evolved into the twentieth century. Three articles in particular 
developed this theme: "Brooks Adams and American Expansion," "The 
Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy," and "On the Restoration of 
Brooks Adams."10 Second, in four articles, "The Legend of Isolationism in 
the 1920s," "Latin America; Laboratory of American Foreign Policy in the 
1920s," "China and Japan; A Challenge and a Choice in the Nineteen 
Twenties," and "A Note on American Foreign Policy in Europe during the 
1920s," Williams attacked the myth that isolationism characterized the inter-
war years. In the process, he explored the expansion of American economic 
power after the First World War and elaborated upon the strategies and 
contradictions of American diplomacy.Third, Williams attacked America's 
^ William Appleman Williams, "Reflections on the Historiography of American Entry into 
World War I," Oregon Historical Quarterly. LVII (September 1956) pp. 274-279; Williams, 
"The Historical Romance of Senator Neuberger's Election," Oregon Historical Quarterly. 
LVl (June 1955) pp. 101-105. 
William Appleman Williams, "Brooks Adams and American Expansionism," New 
England Quarterly. XXV (June 1952) pp. 217-232; Williams, "The Frontier Thesis and 
American Foreign Policy," Pacific Historical Review. XXIV (November 1955) pp. 379-395; 
Williams, "On the Restoration of Brooks Adams," Science and Society. XX (Summer 1956) 
pp. 247-253. 
William Appleman Williams, "The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s," Science and 
Society. XVIII (Winter 1954) pp. 1-20; Williams, "Latin America: Laboratory of American 
Foreign Policy in the 1920s," Inter-American Affairs. 11 (Autumn 1957) pp. 3-30; 
Williams, "China and Japan: A Challenge and a Choice of the Nineteen Twenties," Pacific 
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Cold War policies in a number of articles published in The Nation.'^'^ Within 
the pages of this political weekly, he held the United States responsible for 
instigating the Cold War and forcing the Soviet Union to pursue repressive 
domestic and international policies. 
Overall, with the articles that he published following American-
Russian Relations, Williams developed the component parts for a synthesis 
of contemporary American foreign policy. He presented this synthesis in his 
most famous book. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.^3 
Like Williams' previous publications. Tragedy located the origins of 
modern American diplomacy in the 1890s. During this "crucial decade," 
Williams wrote, "Americans developed a broad consensus in favor of an 
expansionist foreign policy.This was the result of two primary factors. 
First of all, in reaction to the "panic of 1893," business leaders, politicians, and 
intellectuals concluded that foreign markets were essential to absorb surplus 
manufactured goods and to provide raw materials for American factories. 
Second, most Americans, according to Williams, understood the "economic 
and social upheavals" of the 1890s in relation to Frederick Jackson Turner's 
frontier thesis. American leaders recognized the "implicit" recommendation 
in Turner's assertion that the United States' democratic ideals and traditions 
were products of the western frontier, and therefore, sought to sustain 
Historical Review. XXVI (August 1957) pp. 259-279; Williams, "A Note on American 
Foreign Policy in Europe in the 1920s," Science and Society. XVII (Winter 1958) pp. 1-20. 
For example, see William Appleman Williams, "Moscow Peace Drive: Victory for 
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"Babbit's New Fables," The Nation. 182 (January 7, 1956) pp. 3-6; Williams, "Great 
Boomerang: The Irony of Containment," The Nation. 182 ( May 5, 1956) pp. 376-379; 
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World Publishing Co., 1959). 
14 Ibid, p. 29. 
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democracy "by turning abroad for new frontiers.Overall, Williams 
concluded, these beliefs ~ that prosperity and democracy depended upon the 
expansion of foreign markets abroad — defined the worldview or 
"Weltanschauung" for generations of American foreign policy makers, from 
Theodore Roosevelt to John Foster Dulles. 
Foregoing traditional forms of imperialism, Williams continued, the 
United States pursued foreign markets through what he described as 
"imperial anti-colonialism.John Hay's Open Door Notes of 1899 
established this unique approach to empire. Based upon "free trade" and 
equal access to markets, the open door "was designed to establish the 
conditions under which America's preponderant economic power would 
extend the American system...without the embarrassment and inefficiency of 
traditional colonialism,"!^ Beginning in the 1890s, the United States applied 
the open door first in the Far East, then in Central and South America, the 
Middle East, and, by the end of the Second World War, throughout the world. 
Although the strategy for pursuing an "informal empire" developed in 
the initial decades of the twentieth century, the 1920s marked "the coming of 
age of the open door policy."i* Williams attributed the maturation of 
American foreign policy to Herbert Hoover's "concept of a co-operative 
capitalistic economy.As Secretary of Commerce between 1921 and 1928, 
Hoover sought to rationalize America's industrial economy by establishing "a 
harmony of interests" between government, big business, and labor. This 
corporate organization facilitated the internationalization of American 
Ibid, p. 11. 
16 Ibid, p. 23. 
17 Ibid, p. 37. 
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business. It coordinated the legislation, research, and capital necessary to 
promote overseas economic expansion. Moreover, American leaders applied 
these corporatist beliefs "to the world scene." They sought a "community of 
ideals, interests, and purposes" with other industrialized nations in order to 
promote and maintain the international peace and stability required for free 
trade. 20 
Unfortunately, Williams continued, the open door expansion of the 
United States embodied a number of contradictions that created misguided 
policies with tragic consequences. First of all, combining ignorance with 
arrogance and moral self-righteousness (a combination bred from Christianity 
and an unwavering faith in nineteenth-century liberalism), American leaders 
believed that the open door would promote democracy, self-determination, 
and freedom throughout the world. However, the United States' corporate 
expansion, more often than not, subverted such lofty objectives — particularly 
in "underdeveloped" nations. Pointing to Cuba, Mexico, China, the 
Philippines, and a number of Central and South American countries, 
Williams illustrated how the open door created dollar-dominated markets 
that exacerbated disparities of wealth, depleted natural resources, and stunted 
economic diversification. 
Furthermore, because the open door depended upon peace and 
stability, the United States assumed an "essentially conservative character" 
and sought "to preserve the existing order" amidst the "broad revolutionary 
challenges" of the twentieth-century.^i This took the form of supporting 
counter-revolutionary groups in "frontier countries" with economic and 
military aid and at times led to direct armed interventions by the United 
20 Ibid, p. 84. 
21 Ibid, p. 83. 
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States. Ironically, Williams pointed out, the economic impact of the open 
door only exacerbated revolutionary situations throughout the world. 
American leaders therefore continually struggled to counter the realities bred 
by their own policies. The end result was "tragic", for in order to protect the 
open door the United States was too often forced to undermine the self-
determination, welfare, and freedom of foreign nations. 
Williams contended, moreover, that the United State's pursuit of the 
open door undermined any chance of developing a constructive relationship 
with the Soviet Union. Foreign policy makers, in addition to fearing the 
revolutionary potential of communism, perceived state socialism as the 
antithesis to their objectives of free and open markets. The United States 
initially sought to isolate the Soviet Union through the cordon sanitaire in 
Eastern Europe and non-recognition. Unfortunately, non-recognition limited 
American policy options. This was most evident during the 1930s, when, 
even after formally recognizing the Soviet Union, the United States hesitated 
to work with the Russians in order to counter and perhaps contain the 
expansion of German National Socialism and Japanese militarism. 
Finally, Williams concluded that the United States' desire to extend the 
open door after World War II instigated the Cold War. America entered the 
Second World War ("the war for the American frontier") to protect its 
informal empire from fascist aggression. Following the war, American 
leaders intended to re-establish and further the open door throughout the 
entire world. The Roosevelt and Truman administrations, fearing the return 
of depression, considered this necessary in order to sustain war-time levels of 
production, and to thus insure prosperity and protect democracy. The United 
States was therefore unwilling to accept the extension of Soviet power into 
Eastern Europe. After attempting to force the open door upon Russia with 
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economic and atomic power, the Truman administration resorted to 
containment and subsequently initiated the Cold War. 
In the final chapters of Tragedy, Williams summarized the failures of 
the open door and provided advice for a new American foreign policy. He 
contended that, in order to avoid further unrest in the developing world and, 
more urgently, to prevent nuclear war, the United States needed to replace 
the "Weltanschauung" of the open door with the "conception...that 
America's political and economic well-being depend" not upon expansion, 
but rather "the rational and equitable use of its own human and material 
resources at home and in interdependent co-operation with all other peoples 
of the world."22 Such a new world view would promote self-determination 
and freedom and, moreover, facilitate a "relaxation of the Cold War" by 
encouraging an American-Soviet "detente." "Once free from its myopic 
concentration on the Cold War," Williams concluded, "the United States 
could come to grips with the central problem of reordering its own society...so 
that the labor and leisure of its own citizens are invested with creative 
meaning and purpose."23 
Following the publication of Tragedy, Williams turned his attention to 
American expansion prior to the 1890s. He had provided cursory summaries 
of the colonial and early national roots of contemporary foreign policy in both 
American-Russian Relations and Tragedy. Moreover, he traced the 
expansion of the United States throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries in The Shaping of American Diplomacy (1956), a two volume set of 
foreign policy documents and articles. In an article that appeared just prior to 
22 Ibid, pp. 209-210. 
23 Ibid, p. 211. 
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the publication of Tragedy, "The Age of Mercantilism: An Interpretation of 
the American Political Economy 1763-1828/' Williams introduced the first 
chapter for a generalized overview of expansion through the entire American 
experience — an accomplishment completed in 1961 with the publication The 
Contours of American Historv.^^ 
Contours located the origins of the United States in British 
mercantilism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Williams 
understood mercantilism as "a corporate organization of society" where the 
"state had an obligation to serve society by accepting and discharging the 
responsibilities for the general welfare."25 The Earl of Shaftesbury 
exemplified this mercantilist commitment to community. However, 
Williams stressed, "the Weltanschauung of mercantilism" included the belief 
that "the chief way for a nation to promote or achieve its own wealth and 
happiness was to take it away from some other country."^6 These 
fundamental precepts — corporate responsibility sustained by expansion 
through imperialism — took hold in the American colonies and subsequently 
defined "the attitudes, assumptions and ideas" of the founding fathers.27 
According to Williams, mercantilism guided the development of the 
United States from independence until 1828. Throughout this period, 
American leaders remained committed to "the morality of a corporate society 
and the political economy of a balanced mercantilist state."28 Such 
mercantilist ideals were "generally accepted" in every region of America. 
24 William Appleman Williams, "The Age of Mercantilism; An Interpretation of the 
American Political Economy, 1763-1828," The Williams and Mary Quarterly. XV (October 
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These beliefs forged responsive and responsible state governments; 
moreover, they created a national constitution that equipped the federal 
government with the legislative power to provide "the various things 
wanted by the farmer and the mechanic as well as by the landed and 
commercial gentry.Unfortunately, Williams continued, such admirable 
characteristics were offset by two factors. First, mercantilism was based upon 
private property and therefore created a society stratified by inequitable 
distributions of wealth. Furthermore, the United States increasingly came to 
rely upon frontier expansion in order to underwrite prosperity and thus 
lighten corporate responsibility. In the decades following the American 
Revolution, the corporate ideal of mercantilism devolved into "the thesis 
that wealth and welfare hinged upon expansion. Williams concluded that 
this facet of mercantilism "weakened the sense of community and made it 
difficult to establish a check on private and group property interests that 
undercut the general welfare."3i 
In the years following the election of Andrew Jackson, "laissez-nous 
faire" emerged as the predominant "Weltanschauung" in the United States. 
Williams argued that during "the age of laissez-nous faire" Americans 
rejected corporate government, and instead, believed that "individualized 
free competition in an open and fair society would produce specific happiness 
and the general welfare."32 The Western frontier played a central role in 
laissez-nous faire, for it supplied a source of economic opportunity and space 
for economic growth. According to Williams, this was unfortunate. For one 
thing, western expansion dislocated native cultures. Moreover, the frontier 
29 Ibid, p. 123. 
30 Ibid, p. 232. 
31 Ibid, p. 189. 
32 Ibid, p. 246. 
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further undermined corporate ideals by promoting self-interest over social 
responsibility. And, Williams continued, laissez-faire engendered the Civil 
War, first because unbridled expansion forced a clash over slavery and state's 
rights, and second because marketplace ideals left American leaders, 
particularly in the North, unable to compromise and work together. "Lacking 
a creative vision of community," Williams argued, "laissez faire was weak in 
an essential respect: it provided no basis upon which to deal with evil in a 
non-violent way. Its solutions were persistently aggressive and 
acquisitive."33 
The "Weltanschauung of laissez-faire" nonetheless persevered through 
the decades following the Civil War. Its adherence to cut-throat competition 
facilitated industrialization. However, the inefficiency of industrial laissez-
faire led to increasingly more extensive periods of depression and social 
unrest. In the 1890s, American leaders concluded that in order to save 
capitalism "the political economy had to be extensively planned, controlled, 
and coordinated through the institution of the large corporation."34 The 
Republican victory over the "narrowly laissez-faire" Democrats in the 
presidential election of 1896 signaled the political triumph of this belief and 
thus initiated "the age of corporate capitalism."35 During this final era of 
history, Williams concluded, the corporation became the "most powerful 
element" in the American "system," one which "crossed every economic, 
political, and social boundary, affected every branch of government, and 
permeated every aspect of the individual's life."36 
33 Ibid, p. 285. 
34 Ibid, pp. 350-351. 
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The development of corporate capitalism was guided by what Williams 
referred to as the "Weltanschauung of the progressive movement."3^ 
Throughout the initial decades of the twentieth century, progressive 
politicians, labor leaders, intellectuals, businessmen, and religious leaders 
"remained loyal to private property and accepted the basic features of the 
corporation order. "38 The programs initiated by progressives, from the Social 
Gospel to the New Deal, were attempts to sustain the corporate system with 
piecemeal reform. Williams regarded this as negative, for such neo-
mercantilist "paternalism" perpetuated tremendous disparities of wealth, 
alienation, rash consumerism, and conformity. Furthermore, the 
"progressive Weltanschauung" assumed that corporate prosperity could be 
sustained only through expansion. Repeating the arguments presented in 
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, Williams traced the evolution of this 
belief and the "tragic" policies that it engendered from the "open door notes" 
to the Cold War. 
Overall, Williams argued that, from the "age of mercantilism" to "the 
age of corporate capitalism," the United States had sustained a capitalist 
society with perpetual expansion. This fundamental "contour" was 
problematic for a number of reasons. By relying upon "expansion as the 
means of controlling faction and at the same time providing some measure 
of welfare," Americans escaped the responsibility of creating a "democratic 
and equitable, straightforward, and loving...community."39 Instead, the 
frontier supported an oligarchic order based upon private property, 
inequality, and alienation. The expansion of the United States, moreover, 
dislocated Native American cultures, oppressed indigenous peoples 
Ibid, p. 449. 
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throughout the world, and recklessly pushed the world towards nuclear 
annihilation. Williams concluded by asserting that the United States needed 
to escape the "frontier-expansionist" legacy through "the creation of a socialist 
commonwealth."40 "That opportunity," he wrote, "is the only real frontier 
available to Americans in the second half of the 20th century. 
Williams followed the publication of The Contours of American 
History with two considerably shorter books — The United States, Cuba, and 
Castro (1962) and The Great Evasion (1964).42 In the former, Williams used 
the "open door" synthesis to explain the Cuban Revolution and urged 
American leaders to pursue a rapprochement with Castro. Ultimately, he 
suggested using Cuba "to effect a general breakthrough on controlled and 
inspected disarmament" with the Soviets.43 in the latter, Williams, as one 
critic claimed, "gained his reputation as a radical" by espousing the 
"relevance" of Karl Marx to the United States. In doing so, Williams explored 
the domestic side of American expansion and elaborated upon his hopes for a 
decentralized, socialist future.^4 
According to Williams, Marx was pertinent to the American 
experience for three primary reasons. First of all, Marx had claimed that 
capitalist nations, in order to expand the marketplace, pursued imperialist 
foreign policies. As Williams argued in his previous publications, "such 
40 Ibid, p. 488. 
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expansion...is directly and explicitly relevant to an understanding of 
American foreign relations."45 Specifically, Marx had described the three 
forms of imperialism practiced by the United States; colonialism ("the seizure 
or conquest of empty, or lightly populated, real estate and the subsequent 
transfer of other people into the area"), administrative colonialism ("the 
effective control by an outside minority through force and the threat of force 
of alien territory and population"), and economic imperialism (where "a 
backward or undeveloped region or society" is dominated by foreign 
capital) .46 
Second, Marx's assertion that capitalism "created increasing 
proletarianization and increasing misery" was applicable to the United 
States.47 For one thing, American foreign policy had "increased 
unemployment, underemployment, and other economic and social and 
psychological characteristics of misery" throughout the developing world.48 
Domestically, Williams continued, there were several indications of 
economic misery. He maintained that the distribution of income in the 
United States had not changed since the 1920s, the purchasing power of the 
middle class and lower income families had not increased dramatically, and 
the majority of farmers, African-Americans, and women suffered continued 
economic discrimination. And, despite post-war economic growth, there 
remained "between 35 and 50 million human beings who exist under 
conditions of severe deprivation and outright poverty. "49 What appeared as 
post-war prosperity and affluence, moreover, was tied directly to Cold War 
45 Ibid, p. 32. 
46 Ibid, p. 40. 
47 Ibid, p. 55. 
48 Ibid, p. 57. 
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defense budgets and government subsidies; it was therefore misleading. 
Overall, Williams concluded that, "American capitalism has never since 1861 
functioned effectively enough to decrease economic misery over any 
significant period of time, save as it has been stimulated by war or cold 
war."50 
Finally, Williams stressed that "Marx did not define misery in 
exclusively economic terms."The additional, and equally important, 
feature of misery," he pointed out, "concerned the alienation of man — 
socially from other men, individually from himself, and historically from his 
own true nature.Alienation was a predominant characteristic in 
American society: the corporation bred uniformity; "cybernated production" 
(the increasing mechanization and automation of industry) created a 
dehumanizing workplace; private property sustained social divisions while 
promoting "uncreative" consumerism. According to Williams these realities 
fostered juvenile delinquency, "mental disturbances," and "sexual 
promiscuity;" in general, they created "egoistic" Americans who were 
politically apathetic and anti-social. Overall, American capitalism, in 
accordance Marxist criticisms, failed "to create and sustain an ethical and 
equitable community."^3 
As he did in Contours, Williams concluded that the United States 
needed to transcend the failures of its past and present by pursuing a socialist 
future. In the final chapter of The Great Evasion, Williams elaborated upon 
this assertion. He maintained that, first, Americans had to discontinue 
equating private property with freedom. "The point is not that we must 
50 Ibid, p. 83. 
51 Ibid, p. 72. 
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abandon our possessions," he wrote, "but rather that we must re-define the 
possessions as incidental to our functions as humans.Next, Williams 
continued, it was necessary for the United States to "undertake the planned, 
controlled, and co-ordinated movement into full cybernated production. "^5 
This would not only "reduce property to an incidental," but also increase 
efficiency, and foster equitable distributions of wealth. Because "a true 
community is more easily obtainable...in small rather than in large units," 
Americans needed to "decentralize" the existing political and economic 
systems. Williams argued that this could be done by dividing the states into 
"eight to ten" regional communities "established as economic and political 
units grounded in their own co-opertively owned and controlled cybernated 
productive systems.all, Williams concluded, this form of decentralized 
socialism was the only hope for attaining a true American community. 
In the years following the publication of The Great Evasion, Williams 
returned to the study of American expansion. He went on sabbatical during 
the academic year 1967-68 to research and write The Roots of the Modern 
American Empire. In this, his final major contribution to American 
historiography, Williams argued that the "open-door" policy (and therefore, 
contemporary foreign policy in general) was the product of "the fundamental 
assumptions, analyses, and beliefs" of America's "agrarian majority" during 
the nineteenth century 
54 Ibid, p. 174. 
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The arguments presented in Roots were adaptations of Williams' 
previous insights into American expansion. The movement across the 
North American continent during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
was instigated and led by agrarians in search of "more land to sustain and 
advance their commercial agriculture." Moreover, farmers, "individually and 
collectively, large and small," demanded "overseas markets to absorb the 
surpluses they produced."^8 "Agriculturists" became increasingly more 
"articulate" and "militant" exponents of expansion abroad in the decades 
following the Civil War. After agricultural exports helped pull the United 
States out of depression in the 1870s, "metropolitan leaders" began to realize 
"the importance of the overseas market in the functioning of the entire 
economic system.By the 1890s, "the traditional farm emphasis on 
overseas expansion as the strategic solution to the nation's economic and 
social problems" had contributed to the "Weltanschauung" of industrial, 
political, and intellectual leaders. Subsequently, in light of the panic of 1893, 
the United States embarked upon an aggressive foreign policy in pursuit of 
international markets. 
Furthermore, Williams argued that the "social consciousness" that 
accompanied American expansion had agricultural origins. Frederick Jackson 
Turner's frontier thesis, an integral component of the expansionist world 
view was formulated at the grass-roots level by various agricultural 
spokesman" well before the 1890s. Throughout the initial decades of the 
nineteenth-century, American farmers rejected mercantilism and accepted 
"the principles of the political economy of laissez-faire" as defined by Adam 
Smith.60 "Agricultural businessmen" therefore equated freedom, democracy, 
58 Ibid, p. 50. 
59 Ibid, p. 21. 
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and individuality with "a free marketplace economy.According to 
Williams, such an equation deterred American farmers from pursuing 
radical political and social change during periods of depression; instead, 
overseas expansion abroad became the answer to economic stagnation at 
home. Furthermore, agriculturists committed to the self-determination of 
the marketplace "fought hard to make certain that American expansion was 
not institutionalized in the form of traditional colonialism.2 "The 
marketplace conception of the world" led farmers to believe that the 
expansion of American capitalism would nurture freedom, prosperity, and 
democracy throughout the world.^3 xhis belief, Williams concluded, became 
the fundamental, tragic, assumption behind America's "open door empire." 
Overall, The Roots of the Modern American Empire marked the 
culmination of Williams' first two decades as a professional historian. In an 
autobiographical introduction to Roots, he reflected upon his career to date. 
Beginning as a graduate student in the late 1940s, Williams had explored 
Russian-American relations between the First and Second World War. He 
soon realized that this period did not fully explain "Russian-American 
involvement" and therefore expanded his study to include the nineteenth 
century and the years following the Second World War. Subsequently, 
Williams concluded that the 1890s marked the beginning of modern 
American diplomacy. Following American-Russian Relations, he explored 
American foreign policy through the twentieth century, and pieced together 
the "open door" synthesis presented in Tragedy. Williams discovered in the 
course of this study that the economic and ideological components of the 
61 Ibid, p. 15. 
62 Ibid, p. 45. 
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open door predated the 1890s. That realization inspired an examination of 
expansion through the entire history of the United States, and resulted in the 
publication of The Contours of American History. 
The conclusions that Williams made during his first decade as a 
historian led him to advocate alternatives to "marketplace expansion." In the 
years following Tragedy, he turned to Karl Marx and argued that the only way 
the United States could transcend its imperialist legacy was through massive 
economic, political, and social restructuring and the development of 
decentralized, socialist communities. 
Finally, during the 1960s, Williams "came to see the expansionist 
outlook that was entertained and acted upon by metropolitan American 
leaders during and after the 1890s was actually a crystallization in industrial 
form of an outlook that had been developed in agricultural terms" during the 
nineteenth-century.64 This conclusion led to The Roots of the Modern 
American Empire and signaled the end to Williams' most influential years as 
a professional historian. 
Throughout the years following Roots, Williams continued to publish 
extensively.65 The work he produced during the 1970s and into the 1980s, 
however, failed to achieve the notoriety of his previous publications. For one 
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thing, Williams largely reiterated the theses that he established and 
developed during his first decades as a historian. While working at Oregon 
State, he became less of a research historian and, instead, focused his career 
upon teaching undergraduates. Williams' later publications thus continued 
to apply the open door synthesis to American diplomatic history, to attack the 
United States' imperial worldview, to condemn the shortcomings of 
corporate capitalism, and to promote loosely defined forms of decentralized 
socialism. Overall, during the final years of his career, Williams relied upon 
the arguments that established him as an innovative, revisionist historian in 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
Moreover, Williams' later writings were less refined, less historical, 
and more polemical than his earlier publications. His indictments of 
American imperialism, as one critic claimed, turned increasingly "personal" 
and "pedantic. As Williams concluded in his final book. Empire as A Way 
of Life, "Whatever its benefits or rewards, empire is expensive. It costs a very 
great deal of money. It kills a large number of human beings. It confines and 
progressively throttles spontaneity and imagination. It substitutes paranoid 
togetherness for community. It limits the play of the mind. And even, at the 
rudimentary marketplace level it becomes self-defeating.""67 
66 John Lukacs, "Review of Empire as a Way of Life." New Republic, 31 (Oct. 11, 1980) 
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Chapter IV - William Appleman Williams: Progressive, Consenus, New Left 
Historian 
William Appleman Williams was one of the intellectual godfathers of 
the new left. With the work that he produced during the 1950s and 1960s, 
Williams distinguished himself from the predominant intellectual trends of 
the 1950s and helped nurture the cultural and intellectual radicalism that 
erupted during the 1960s. His work departed from the conservative 
liberalism of the early post-war era, spurred a wave of revisionism within the 
field of diplomatic history, and inspired a young generation of radicals who 
came of age in the 1960s. 
Williams is, as such, an appropriate subject for the intellectual 
historian. The fact that he is neglected by most intellectual and cultural 
historians obscures a telling example of how a strand of new left radicalism 
developed through the decades following the Second World War. Williams 
is particularly relevant to the task of breaking down distinctions between the 
"conservative" 1950s and the "radical" 1960s. Simply, his work exemplifies 
continuity between the post-war decades. Williams' scholarship embodied a 
major source of dissent within the historical profession that was established 
in the 1950s and evolved through the 1960s. In fact, Williams developed the 
majority of the arguments that defined his career between 1950, when he 
received his doctorate, and 1961, when he published The Contours of 
American History. In all, his scholarship illustrates what Maurice Isserman 
referred to as "the continual process of unfolding" between the initial post­
war decades.i 
1 Maurice Isserman, If I Had a Hammer, p. xiii. 
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When examined from an intellectual historian's perspective, 
moreover, Williams' revisionism transcends the broad characterization of, 
simply, new left. His work was informed by several of the themes, theses, 
and methodologies of both progressive and consensus historiography. 
Williams pioneered a new left perspective on history; yet his scholarship 
incorporated both the progressive and consensus traditions. 
Drawing upon the information provided in the previous three 
chapters, the following pages explore Williams' relation to progressive, 
consensus, and new left historiography. This chapter identifies aspects of his 
work that are characteristic of these different schools of thought. It does not 
pretend, however, to provide a comprehensive analysis of Williams' 
revisionism. One could explore each of Williams' influences and arguments, 
dissect their sub-arguments, and find a near endless amount of correlations to 
progressive, consensus, and new left history.^ Such a task transcends the 
scope of this study. Instead, the following pages explore the most relevant 
facets of Williams' career and scholarship. In doing so, they highlight the 
nature of one historian and provide insight into the origins of the new left. 
Williams as Progressive Historian 
William Appleman Williams was, in several respects, an heir to the 
progressive school of American historiography. Although he began his 
training as a professional historian in 1946, a time when the consensus school 
had displaced progressivism, Williams' scholarship upheld and embodied 
many of the fundamental assumptions of progressive thought. In particular, 
2 Such an examination is particularly challenging in regards to influences. An attempt to 
highlight all of the people that informed Williams' scholarship is an assignment 
approaching the impossible, for Williams acknowledged virtually everyone with whom he 
came into contact during these decades, from helpful librarians to Spinoza. 
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the present-mindedness that guided all of his major publications, his 
emphasis on economic factors in determining history, the implicit 
isolationism that colored his attacks on foreign policy, his sympathy for the 
"democratic elements" of the past, and his reliance upon Frederick Jackson 
Turner's frontier thesis, distinguished Williams as a neo-progressive 
historian. A number of factors shaped Williams' progressivism — primarily, 
his upbringing in Atlantic, Iowa, his education at the University of 
Wisconsin, and his respect for and emulation of progressive historian, 
Charles Beard. 
Born and bred in Atlantic, Iowa and educated at the University of 
Wisconsin, Williams' intellectual development was the product of middle-
west, progressive traditions. Henry Steele Commager described this region of 
"the American mind " as the "middle border" — an intellectual environment 
that "produced Lester Ward and Frederick Turner, Vernon Farrington, 
Charles Beard, Simon Patten, John R. Commons, and so many others that 
broke through the neat patterns of thought which the wise men of the East 
designed for them."3 This "middle border " shaped Williams' intellectual 
consciousness. For one thing, growing up in Iowa during the depression, he 
developed an affinity with the hardships endured by the American farmer. 
He thus realized at an early age the tensions between the "people" and the 
"interests" and allied himself with the former. Atlantic, moreover, 
represented to Williams a truly democratic community, one distinct from the 
urban centers of the East Coast. Finally, as Joseph Siracusa has speculated, 
during his youth, "Williams imbibed the agricultural community's 
^ Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and 
Character Since the 1890s (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1950) p. 237. 
72 
traditional noninterventionist outlook, which almost always has viewed the 
wisdom of political overseas entanglements with considerable suspicion. 
The kinship with progressivism that Williams' "middle border" 
background nurtured was furthered at the University of Wisconsin. There, 
he trained at the center of mid-west, progressive thought and learned history 
from a number of progressive historians — most notably, Merle Curti, 
William B. Hesseltine, Merril Jensen, and Fred Harvey Harrington. 
Although he acknowledged the influence of Madison's progressive historians 
upon his work, Williams associated his scholarship most clearly with the 
dean of progressive history, Charles Beard. 
Early in his career, Williams published two articles on the life and 
work of Beard.5 Both articles defended Beard in light of criticisms leveled at 
the progressive in the years following the Second World War. Through these 
assessments, Williams presented the fundamental assumptions that guided 
his own approach to the study of history.6 
Williams was drawn to Beard for a number of reasons. First, he 
stressed the progressive historian's commitment to the present. "Beard 
studied history," Williams pointed out, "to equip himself to comprehend and 
change his own society: to understand the direction and tempo of its 
movement, and to pinpoint the places at which to apply his energy and 
influence in an effort to modify both aspects of its development."? Such 
Joseph Siracusa, New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American 
Revisionists (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1973) p. 25. 
5 William Appleman Williams, "A Note on Charles Austin Beard's Search for a General 
Theory of Causation," The American Historical Review. LXII (October 1956) pp. 59-80; 
Williams, "Charles Austin Beard: The Intellectual as Tory-Radical," in American Radicals: 
Some Problems and Personalities, ed. by Harvey Goldberg (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1957). 
^ Moreover, Williams acknowledged his respect for Beard in The Contours of American 
History and in several other articles published during the 1950s. 
^ Williams, "Charles Austin Beard: Intellectual as Tory-Radical," p. 303. 
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purpose of scholarship, to locate and explain the origins of contemporary 
problems for insight into future alternatives, was a facet not only of Beard's 
work, but of progressive historiography in general.8 And, for Williams, it 
was the guiding principle to the study of American history — what he referred 
to in the introduction to The Contours of American History as "History as a 
Way of Learning." "History's great tradition," he explained, "is to help us 
understand ourselves and our world so that each of us individually and in 
conjunction with our fellow men, can formulate relevant and reasoned 
alternatives and become meaningful actors in making history."9 
Moreover, Williams embraced Beard's attempt to achieve a synthesis 
of the entire American experience. He contended that in order to understand 
contemporary problems it was necessary, as Beard had done, to define the 
"long-term generalized" patterns of the past. Employing a defense that he 
used against attacks upon his own work, Williams explained that "Beard's 
over-all interpretations...are extremely difficult to destroy, whereas specific 
aspects of their analyses can be seriously modified or disproved." Such was 
the price of achieving synthesis. As Williams continued: "It was not that 
Beard ignored or monkeyed with evidence, for he was fanatically honest. But 
he tended, in his concern and haste to find clues for the present, to work with 
his hypothesis instead of from it. But for Beard specific mistakes were of far 
less concern that the validity of his general analysis of American history."10 
Among the host of influences that contributed to Williams' 
scholarship, Charles Beard was, at least during the 1950s and the 1960s, the 
^ See the analysis of progressive historiography in chapter II. 
^ Williams, The Contours of American Historv. p. 19. Williams reiterated a similar 
philosophy of history in the introductions and conclusions to The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy and The Roots of the Modern American Empire. See, respectively, "History and 
the Present Crises" and "Notes on the Relevance of History." 
Williams, "Charles Austin Beard: Intellectual as Tory-Radical," p. 302. 
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most prominent. Every one of Williams' major publications throughout 
these decades sought to locate in the past the sources of contemporary 
problems and to use history to advocate policies and directions for the future. 
Furthermore, Williams attempted to achieve this objective by constructing a 
number of general, historical syntheses. As a graduate student in the late 
1940s, he studied history in order to understand "the crises connected with 
the Cold War" and therefore set out to "place the Cold War in the perspective 
of the long sweep of Russian-American involvement."ii Williams retained 
this initial commitment to the present throughout the early post-war decades. 
In Tragedy, he constructed a synthesis of twentieth-century American 
diplomacy in part to "prompt the United States to undertake a fundamental 
review and critique of its own domestic and foreign policies."12 In Contours, 
he presented a general overview of American expansion as "a way of 
learning, a way of mustering knowledge, courage, and will to break free of the 
past."13 And, in Roots, Williams stressed the "relevance" of understanding 
the agricultural origins of foreign policy to "the enormous task of making 
sense out of our contemporary predicament, and to the work of formulating 
and acting on positive and creative alternatives to that unhappy situation, 
Beyond his general adherence to progressive present-mindedness, 
Williams' scholarship included a number of elements that paralleled the 
work of Beard and other progressive historians. For example, although 
Williams departed from Beard's economic interpretation of history in several 
respects, he accepted the progressive's "emphasis on the importance of 
11 Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire, p. xii. 
12 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, p. 11. 
Williams, The Contours of American History, p. 6. 
Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire, p. ix. 
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economics" in shaping history .15 Both The Contours of American History 
and The Roots of the Modern American Empire were largely based upon 
Williams' understanding of "marketplace capitalism" and the attitudes, 
assumptions, and beliefs that it promoted. Both works also focused on 
inequitable distributions of wealth under capitalism and upheld Beard's 
insistence that "economic conflict and development is unending, and that it 
must constantly be analyzed, whatever the organization of society."i6 
Furthermore, Williams' analyses of diplomacy revolved around the 
primacy of economic factors in determining foreign policies. As Beard had 
done in The Idea of National Interest and The Open Door at Home, Williams 
stressed that American foreign policy was, to a large degree, a quest for new 
markets and investment opportunities abroad needed to facilitate the growth 
of the American economy .17 This economic determinism predominated 
Williams' analysis of the United States' approach to the Soviet Union in 
American-Russian Relations and became an integral component of his more 
sophisticated analyses of the "Weltanschauung " of expansion presented in 
Tragedy, Contours, and Roots. 
Williams also shared with Beard and the progressive tradition a 
tendency towards isolationism. Throughout American-Russian Relations, 
Tragedy, and Contours, Williams attacked the United States for its 
involvement in the armed conflicts of the twentieth-century, from the 
Spanish-American War to the Cold War. He praised, moreover, such 
"isolationists" as William Borah, Robert Lafollette, and Hiram Johnson. In 
Williams, "A Note on Charles Austin Beard's Search for a General Theory of Causation," 
p. 76. 
16 Ibid, p. 76. 
Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934) 
chapters 4,5, and 7; Beard, The Open Door at Home (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934) 
chapter 10. 
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this regard, Williams' scholarship reflected the isolationist sentiments 
prevalent in the mid-west between the First and Second World Wars and 
through the 1950s. More specifically however, he espoused the isolationism 
of Beard. Williams condemned, as had Beard, American leaders for pursuing 
foreign policies as a means to alleviate periods of depression and social 
unrest. And, like Beard, he advocated a reorganization of the United States' 
economic institutions to free America from the need for pursuing 
international markets. 
Beyond stressing the role of economics in history and advocating 
isolationism, Williams shared with the progressive tradition a commitment 
to the democratic process and a disdain for economic elites. He embraced 
Beard's attempt to "unmask in his writings the self-deceptions and public 
fabrications" of American politics.19 Throughout all of his major 
publications, moreover, Williams allied himself with those excluded from 
economic prosperity and political representation — particularly, the American 
farmer and laborer. Furthermore, he continually trumpeted the virtues of 
small, representative communities as alternatives to the economically 
stratified, anti-democratic, American state. 
In addition to his admiration for Beard and his acceptance of several 
progressive theses, Williams identified himself as a neo-progressive by 
embracing the work of Frederick Jackson Turner. Williams not only accepted 
Turner's frontier thesis, he based much of his career upon it. Williams' 
analyses of contemporary American diplomacy, his synthesis of American 
history, and his insights into the agricultural origins of the open door policy, 
were all based upon Turner's thesis that the United States' economic 
18 pqj- examples of Beard's isolationism see his The Open Door at Home, chapter 12 and A 
Foreign Policy for America (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1940) chapter 5. 
19 Williams, "Charles Austin Beard; Intellectual as Tory-Radical," p. 299. 
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prosperity and democratic traditions were products of the western frontier. 
According to Williams, most historians overlooked the "primary importance 
of expansion in [Turner's] argument."20 Williams, on the other hand, 
recognized that the term "frontier" was static and therefore misleading; it 
obscured "the expansionist thrust that acquired the sequence of frontiers" 
throughout American history."21 Thus, Williams understood Turner as the 
originator of the "frontier-expansionist" thesis which held that only 
continued expansion could "sustain the dynamic relationship 
between...prosperity, democracy, and domestic well-being and order."22 
Williams realized the importance of Turner's thesis to American 
diplomacy early in his career. While researching Russian-American 
Relations, he discovered that during the 1890s American leaders "applied the 
frontier-expansionist thesis to the problems of the late nineteenth and 
twentieth century' and subsequently established the "open-door" policy in an 
attempt to perpetuate American expansion beyond the North American 
continent.23 In the years following Russian-American Relations, Williams 
explored "the role of the frontier thesis in the making of twentieth-century 
foreign policy."24 This examination culminated with The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy. Here, while researching, he realized that "Americans 
had thought in terms of, and had acted on, the central ideas of Turner's 
frontier thesis long before Turner had been born. "25 This conclusion inspired 
both The Contours of American History and The Roots of the Modern 
American Empire. 
20 Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire, p. xii. 
21 Ibid, p. xiii. 
22 Ibid, p. xiv. 
23 Ibid, p. xiv. 
24 Ibid, p. XV 
25 Ibid, p. xvi. 
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In several important respects, Williams' scholarship of the 1950s and 
1960s sustained the progressive tradition in American historiography. 
Williams was a middle border intellectual who studied history as a means to 
advocate change; he stressed the importance of economics in determining the 
past; he recommended isolationism as an alternative to expansionism; he 
sympathized with the United States' democratic elements and he attacked the 
inequalities bred from American capitalism. In addition, Williams based his 
analysis of American expansion on Turner's frontier thesis. However, while 
Williams reliance upon Turner further associated his scholarship with 
progressive history, it also, in part, distinguished him from the progressive 
tradition. For Williams "frontier-expansionist" interpretation of history 
embodied several characteristics shared by the consensus school of American 
historiography. 
Williams as Consensus Historian 
Although Williams embraced several progressive themes, he was, in 
several respects, also a consensus historian. When he arrived at the 
University of Wisconsin in 1948 to begin his graduate studies, progressive 
historiography was under attack by a young generation of consensus 
historians. The consensus school, spearheaded by scholars such as Daniel 
Boors tin, Oscar Handlin, and Louis Hartz, largely eclipsed progressive 
scholarship in the years following the Second World War. 26 Despite the fact 
that he studied at Wisconsin, an enclave of post-war progressivism, Williams 
took part in the national turn towards consensus historiography. 
26 See chapter II. 
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Like other consensus historians, Williams departed from progressive 
history by rejecting "the progressive paradigm. "27 He dismissed the 
assumption that perpetual conflicts between capitalist and democratic 
elements characterized American history. Instead, Williams stressed "the 
extraordinarily deep and broad economic, social, and political agreements 
which have characterized the overwhelming majority of policies and 
programs pursued in America since colonial times."28 Where Daniel 
Boorstin linked such consensus to the inherent "giveness" of American 
ideals and institutions and where Louis Hartz attributed consensus to the 
United States' "liberal tradition," Williams found consensus in what he 
referred to as the "Weltanschauung" or worldview of American expansion. 
Williams understood "the concept of Weltanschauung" to mean a 
"definition of the world combined with an explanation of how it works." 
"Every sane adult," he wrote in the introduction to The Contours of 
American History, "has such an inclusive conception of the world which cuts 
across and subsumes personal motives, group interests, and class 
ideologies."29 Later in his career, Williams acknowledged that he learned 
about "Weltanschauungen" from "the Germans," particularly Dilthey, Hegel, 
and Marx.30 He concluded from these thinkers that in "an organic 
world...separate parts are in reality always internally related to each other" 
and that "an ostensibly positivistic fact is in truth a set of relationships with 
all other facts and therefore with the whole."31 Working from such 
For a description of the progressive paradigm see chapter IL 
28 Richard Melanson, "The Social and Political Thought of William Appleman Williams," 
Western Political Quarterly. 31 (1978) p. 397. 
Williams, The Contours of American History, p. 20. 
William Appleman Williams, "Confessions of an Intransigent Revisionist," from A 
William Appleman Williams Reader, ed. by Henry Berger (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1992) p. 
343. 
31 Ibid, p. 340. 
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assumptions, Williams set out early in his career to discover "a set of internal 
relations that would make it possible to conceptualize the organic sense of 
reality entertained by American policy makers (and, by indirection, by the 
American body politic) "32 In doing so, he pieced together what he claimed 
were the component parts of "America's conception of the world."33 
According to Williams, the worldview shared by most Americans 
embodied a combination of Turner's frontier thesis, the political and 
economic philosophies of Adam Smith and John Locke, and Christian 
morality .34 He contended that, historically, Americans believed that 
democracy, freedom, and prosperity were contingent upon continental and 
international expansion. They defined these virtues, moreover, in relation to 
Adam Smith's "marketplace capitalism" and Lockean notions of 
individuality; therefore, freedom and equality were synonymous with private 
property, economic growth, and competition. Americans backed these beliefs 
and ideals with Christianity and assumed that their society and its growth and 
expansion were justified by God and therefore righteous. Williams 
concluded, overall, that throughout the eras of American history a moralistic 
commitment to expansion in order to nurture marketplace capitalism 
defined "the fundamental assumptions, analyses, and beliefs of the great 
majority of the people of the United States."35 
Based upon this understanding of an American "Weltanschauung, " 
Williams' three major publications of post-war decades. The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy, The Contours of American History, and The Roots of 
the Modern American Empire were consensus histories. In each, particularly 
Ibid, p. 342. 
Williams, The Contours of American History, p. 172. 
Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire, p.23. 
35 Ibid, p. 23. 
81 
Contours, Williams acknowledged political struggles, radical dissent, and 
social unrest; however, all three of these histories subverted conflict to the 
coalitions, shared assumptions, and compromises bred from the United 
States' "broad consensus on expansion."36 Williams argued that, from 
independence to the Cold War, most Americans — conservatives, liberals and 
reformers. Northerners and Southerners, Virginians and New Englanders, 
industrialists, agriculturalists, imperialists and so-called isolationists — 
shared, in some fashion, the component parts of the expansionist world view. 
In Tragedy, Williams found consensus among "all segments of American 
leadership" between 1890 and the 1950s, for they shared the "Weltanschauung 
of the open door."37 Contours traced the evolution of American expansion 
through the "Weltanschauungen" of mercantilism, laissez-faire, and the 
progressive movement; "the consensus" behind the world views guiding 
these three stages of expansion, he concluded, "was impressive."38 Finally, in 
Roots, Williams explored "the consensus on expansion that had been so 
largely created by agriculturalists" during the nineteenth century.39 
Although Williams shared with other historians in the post-war era a 
conception of the past that stressed consensus over conflict, his scholarship 
remained distinct from the predominant historiographical trends of the 
1950s. Most consensus historians either celebrated or else remained 
ambivalent about the broad-based agreements of the past. Williams' 
consensus histories, on the other hand, cast scathing indictments upon 
American traditions, values, and beliefs. For Williams, America's worldview 
of expansion was nothing to praise, honor, or defend. Rather, he continually 
36 Ibid, p. 35. 
Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, p. 207. 
Williams, The Contours of American History, p. 270. 
39 Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire, p. 35. 
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stressed the alienation and inequality bred from American capitalism, the 
impact of American expansion upon indigenous peoples throughout the 
world, and the shallowness of American morality. Where Daniel Boorstin 
depicted consensus as a product of "genius," Williams condemned it as 
"tragic." Such reproach distinguished Williams from the consensus school 
and, moreover, established him as an early, new left historian. 
Williams as New Left Historian 
The new left historiography that emerged out of the 1950s and 
burgeoned during the 1960s defies precise definition. Like the broader 
intellectual and cultural radicalism of the 1960s, new left history, as Allen 
Matusow noted, developed "without an adequate ideological framework" and 
is thus best understood in terms of its radical char acte ris tics .40 Drawing upon 
the progressive and Marxist traditions, the new left rejected American 
liberalism and the United States' involvement in the Cold War; new left 
historians departed from the consensus school by recognizing and stressing 
the inequality, poverty, and social conflicts bred from American capitalism, 
the mindless consumerism, alienation and racism perpetuated by American 
institutions and traditions, and the imperialistic nature of American foreign 
policy. Moreover, the new left imbued its history with a present-mindedness 
aimed at "the re-education of America to make it see both past and future in a 
Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1984) p. 309. This discussion of new left historiography is 
drawn primarily from the introduction to Barton Bernstein's Towards a New Past: 
Dissenting Essays in American History (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), Irwin Unger's, 
"The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States' 
Historiography," American Historical Review. LXXII (July 1967) and Christopher Lasch's 
"The Cold War, Revisited and Revisioned," New York Times Magazine (January 14, 1968). 
83 
very different way, as expressions of a redeeming New Reality demanding to 
be realized. "41 
In many ways, William Appleman Williams was an early new left 
historian. His scholarship embodied, for one thing, several of the critical 
theses of new left historiography. Furthermore, a generation removed from 
the radicals who came of age in the 1960s, Williams inspired the work of 
some of the most prominent members of the new left. Finally, his 
revisionism not only informed and influenced students of history but also 
helped shape and reflected the concerns and ideals of the broader spectrum of 
political radicals in the sixties. According to Clifford Solway, Williams 
occupied "the special, soulful niche of Great Teacher — an authentic campus 
hero, the kind whose work is consumed ritualistically, then discussed, 
solemnly and forever, over coffee and doughnuts in the morning, beer and 
pizza at night.'"42 
Much of what allied Williams with the progressive tradition also 
distinguished his scholarship, by the early 1960s, as new left. The critical 
present-mindedness that pervaded his work, his moralistic attack upon 
American institutions and traditions, and his acceptance of Beard's foreign 
policy criticisms, were all integral facets of new left historiography. Although 
he departed from the progressive thesis regarding the conflict-ridden nature 
of the past, an assumption upheld and expanded upon by other new left 
historians, Williams acted, in many ways, as an intermediary between the 
progressive and new left schools. In general, he sustained the essence of 
progressive scholarship through the initial post-war years and helped pass it 
on to the radicals of the 1960s. 
Clifford Solway, "Turning History Upside Down," Saturday Review dune 20, 1970) 
p. 15. 
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Williams most direct and significant contribution to the new left came 
in the field of diplomatic history. In American-Russian Relations and The 
Tragedy of American Diplomacy he presented the fundamental arguments 
that became standard assumptions for the new left's analyses of American 
foreign policy. Both texts were arguably Williams most innovative and 
important works, for they were written and researched in the late 1940s and 
1950s — well before the initial stirrings of new left radicalism. By depicting 
America as an imperialist power, stressing the role of economics in the 
making of foreign policy, arguing that the United States forced the issues that 
created the cold war, and focusing upon the impact of American policy in the 
underdeveloped world, American-Russian Relations and The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy attacked the conventional wisdom of the 1950s 
regarding the foreign policies of the United States. 
Williams' work resonated throughout the field of diplomatic history 
and nurtured a wave of revisionism during the 1960s. "It is scarcely an 
exaggeration," Robert Maddox wrote in a critical review, "to say that much of 
the existing revisionist, or 'new left' literature on [American foreign policy] 
amounts to little more than extended footnotes on interpretations Williams 
first put forward."43 First of all, Williams directly influenced a number of 
graduate students whom he trained while teaching at the University of 
Wisconsin. Among the most notable of Williams' students were Walter 
Lafeber, Lloyd C. Gardner and Thomas McCormick. Lafeber's The New 
Empire and America, Russia and the Cold War, Gardner's Economic Aspects 
of the New Deal and Architects of Illusion, and McCormick's China Market: 
America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901 all upheld and applied 
43 Robert J. Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (Princeton University 
Press: Princeton, 1973) p. 13. 
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Williams' understanding of open door imperialism to various eras of 
American diplomatic history .44 Furthermore, as Bradford Perkins noted, 
Williams' work influenced other new left, diplomatic historians, particularly 
those who attacked America's involvement in the Cold War. Gar 
Alperovitz's Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, David Horowitz's 
The Free World Colossus, and Barton Bernstein's "American Foreign Policy 
and the Origins of the Cold War, " to name but a few, all expanded upon 
arguments that Williams introduced in American-Russian Relations and 
Tragedy .45 
Beyond diplomatic history, Williams' work included arguments and 
analyses that influenced new left historians working in other fields. For 
example, according to Christopher Lasch, "the concept of corporate liberalism, 
which has contributed so much to the reinterpretation of American 
progressivism, comes directly from Williams."46 Williams' criticisms 
regarding the anti-democratic and imperialistic nature of the American 
corporation and his assertion that progressive reform, from the late 
twentieth-century to the New Deal, did not radically change American 
political or social institutions, but rather only helped to preserve the United 
Walter Lafeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion. 1880-1898 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963); Lafeber, America. Russia and the Cold War (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1957); Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal 
Diplomacy (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965); Gardner, Architects of 
Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy. 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1970); Thomas J. McCormick, China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire. 
1893-1901 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967). 
Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, The Use of the Atomic 
Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1970); 
David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Policy in the Cold War 
(New York: Hall and Wang, 1965); Barton Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy and the 
Origins of the Cold War," from his Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970). 
46 Christpoher Lasch, "William Appleman Williams On American History," Marxist 
Perspectives. 3 (Fall 1978) p. 118. 
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States' corporate-capitalist system introduced a core of arguments that became 
general theses for new left historians. Specifically, such assertions departed 
from "liberal democratic consensus" interpretations that praised the 
"flexibility," the "discontinuity with the immediate past," and the 
"accomplishments" of the New Deal.47 In Russian-American Relations, 
Tragedy and Contours, Williams inverted this analysis and stressed the New 
Deal's historical continuity, its ideological inflexibility and its failure to end 
the depression.48 
By sustaining the progressive tradition, attacking American diplomacy, 
and criticizing corporate liberalism, Williams made his most notable 
contributions to new left historiography. Other facets of his revisionism, 
however, reflected and informed the radicalism of both historical scholarship 
and the student new left.49 He was, for instance, new left in his 
understanding and use of Marx. Like the radical students of the 1960s, 
Williams' Marxism departed from the old left's dogmatic and doctrinaire 
commitment to communist theory.so Williams used Marx, rather, primarily 
47 Quotations from Barton Bernstein's "The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of 
Liberal Reform," from Bernstein's Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American 
History (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968) p. 263. As Bernstein points out, the most 
notable "consensus" accounts of the New Deal include Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s The Crises 
of the Old Order (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1957), Carl Degler's Out of Our Past (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1959), and William Leuchtenburg's Franklin Delano Roosevelt and 
the New Deal. 1932-1940 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963). 
48 por examples of new left interpretations that followed Williams see Barton Bernstein's 
"The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform," and "America in War 
and Peace: The Test of Liberalism," both from his Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays 
in American History. Bernstein's work exemplifies the new left's rejection of New Deal 
liberalism and was, as he noted, directly influenced by Williams. 
For overviews of the student new left see Todd Gitlin's The 1960s: Years of Hope. Days 
of Rage. Maurice Isserman's If 1 Had A Hammer. Kirkpatrick Sale's SDS (New York: Random 
House, 1973), Irwin Unger's The Movement: The History of the American New Left. 1959-
1970 (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1974), and Edward J. Bacciocco's The New Left in 
America: Reform to Revolution. 1956-1970 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974). 
For a discussion that compares the old and new left's use of Marx see John Patrick 
Diggins' The Rise and Fall of the American Left, pp. 231-238. See also Maurice Isserman's 
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for his analysis of the alienation and conformity perpetuated by corporate 
capitalism. In The Great Evasion, for example, Williams overlooked Marxist 
notions of class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the labor 
theory of value. He focused instead on "the humanistic socialism of the early 
Marx."51 Indeed, throughout The Great Evasion, as noted in a review by 
Eugene Genovese, Williams ignored "most of the work of the mature Marx" 
(like Das Kapital) and concentrated upon "the problems of alienation 
discussed in his youthful" publications.52 
Furthermore, Williams' analysis of American society and culture 
contained several of the theses and themes characteristic of new left 
radicalism. Poverty, racism, consumerism, conformity and the 
"dehumanization" bred from "cybernated production" were issues 
championed by student radicals in the 1960s. Although Williams examined 
these phenomena in the context of Marx, most of his arguments were drawn 
from other post-war scholars who influenced the new left. Williams' 
criticisms of American society and culture, particularly those presented in 
Tragedy. Contours and The Great Evasion either directly incorporated or 
mirrored the work of scholars such as William Whyte, C. Wright Mills, 
Herbert Marcuse, and Michael Harrington.^3 
If I Had A Hammer, pp. 114-123, and Todd Gitlin's The Sixties: Years of Hope. Days of 
Rage, pp. 109-126. 
Irwin Linger, The Movement p. 7. 
Eugene Genovese, "William Appleman Williams on Marx and America," Studies on the 
Left. VI (Jan-Feb. 1966), p. 76. For an example of how Williams' Marxism reflected that of 
the student left see Thomas Hayden's "Port Huron Statement," and "A Letter to the New 
(Young) Left," both reprinted in Mitchell Cohen and Dennis Hale's The New Student Left: 
An Anthology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). 
53 In Tragedy. Williams acknowledged Mills' White Collar. In The Great Evasion he cited 
and drew extensively from Harrington's The Other America: Poverty in the United States 
(New York: Macmillan Press, 1962) and Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the 
Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964). 
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Williams' analysis of American diplomacy also informed the student 
new left's understanding of foreign policy — particularly in regard to Cuba and 
Vietnam. His "open door" synthesis gained stock during the 1960s, for it 
provided both the arguments and language that student radicals used to 
attack American failures in both of these nations. Moreover, Williams' 
sympathies for the Mexican, Bolshevik, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions 
reflected what Allen Matusow described as the new left's "romantic sense of 
identification with Third World revolutionaries" such as Castro, Che 
Guevara, and Ho Chi Minh.54 
Just as many of Williams' arguments and analyses were new left, so 
was his alternative vision for America. His assertion, introduced in Contours 
and elaborated upon in The Great Evasion, that the United States should 
establish regional, socialist communities was part of the new left's emphasis 
on "decentralization."55 Skeptical of the large bureaucratic states established 
by capitalists and communists alike, Williams shared with student radicals 
the desire to create "true communities" at the local level. His claim, 
furthermore, that decentralized socialism would foster a "truly human 
community," "beautiful instead of ugly," one that facilitated "human 
relationships" and allowed "men and women" to "define their own 
identity...outside the confining limits of property and the bruising and 
destructive dynamics of the competitive marketplace," reflected the new left's 
definition of a moral society.56 
Matusow, The Unraveling of America, p. 326. For a more balanced account of the new 
left's identification with such revolutionaries see Todd Gitlin's The Sixties: Years of Hope. 
Days of Rage, pp. 261-274, 
55 See Maurice Issersman's If 1 Had a Hammer, p. 118. 
56 Williams, The Great Evasion, p. 176. For a discussion of the new left's sense of 
community see Gitlin's The Sixties: Years of Hope. Davs of Rage, chapter 5. 
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Finally, Williams distinguished himself as a new left historian 
through his intimate involvement with Madison's student radicals and his 
participation in both the civil rights and anti-war movements. He served, for 
one thing, as an academic advisor for Studies on the Left, an early new left 
publication established by several of his students. Moreover, throughout the 
1950s and the 1960s, he actively protested segregation, racism, and the United 
States' involvement in Vietnam. Such activism was an integral component 
of the new left. Taking direct action to combat "injustice," as Todd Gitlin 
noted, distinguished new left radicals from the old left's tendency to simply 
debate and discuss issues.^^ As Williams reflected upon his activism, "There 
are moments when serious protest promises consequences, and in those 
instances, I have signed my name, written a private letter, walked the streets, 
or sent my money."58 
In sum, several facets of Williams' work and career established him as 
a leading new left historian in the 1960s. Drawing largely from the 
progressive tradition, he vigorously and continuously attacked American 
expansion and foreign policy. He stressed the inequalities of marketplace 
capitalism, deplored the racism of American society, and bemoaned the 
alienation created by a corporate economy. Furthermore, Williams departed 
from the old left's dogmatic understanding of Marx, loosely espoused Marx 
the humanist, and advocated the pursuit of a "moral" society through the 
development of decentralized, socialist communities. Finally, Williams 
furthered his association with the new left by participating in protests against 
racial segregation and the Vietnam war. 
57 For a discussion of the new left's activism see Gitlin's The Sixties: Year of Hope Days of 
Rage, chapter 4. See also Maurice Isserman's If I Had A Hammer, chapter 5. 
Williams, "Confessions of an Intransigent Revisionist," p. 339. 
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In all, William Appleman Williams was an early new left historian 
whose scholarship incorporated elements of both progressive and consensus 
history. First of all, Williams inherited and accepted several themes of 
progressive historiography. He studied history as a means for advocating 
reform, he stressed the importance of economics in determining the past, and 
he upheld America's democratic elements while attacking most economic 
and political elites. Moreover, Williams emulated progressive historian 
Charles Beard, embraced the work of Frederick Jackson Turner, and espoused 
isolationism as opposed to continued American expansion. 
However, despite his affinity with progressive history, Williams 
rejected the notion that perpetual conflicts fueled the historical record. He 
found consensus throughout American history in the worldview of 
expansion. In this regard, Williams departed from the progressive tradition 
and, like other historians of the 1950s, stressed the agreements, compromises, 
and common assumptions of the past. And yet, while most consensus 
scholars accepted, if not celebrated, the United States, Williams assailed 
American institutions and traditions. In doing so, he distinguished himself 
as a leading new left historian. Williams' criticisms of American diplomacy, 
his rejection of corporate capitalism, and his call for a moral, decentralized 
socialism informed and reflected the ideals and beliefs of a young generation 
of radicals and revisionists who came of age during the 1960s. 
Conclusion 
Between 1950 and 1968, William Appleman Williams established 
himself as a leading new left historian. He did so by drawing largely from the 
progressive tradition of American historiography and by incorporating 
important ideas of consenus history. During the 1950s, Williams developed 
his combination of progressive and consensus thought and molded it into a 
new radical analysis that by the early 1960s gained national recognition. This 
process illustrates the thesis of recent cultural and intellectual historians that 
the 1950s served as a seedbed for the radicalism of the following decade. 
Williams' progressivism was a product of his middle-west roots and 
his education at the University of Wisconsin. Through directly sharing in 
the hardships of a small-town, agricultural community during the great 
depression, he developed, at a young age, an intimate appreciation for several 
of the themes and theses of progressive historiography. This intuitive 
attraction to the progressive tradition was nurtured at an intellectual level in 
the years following the Second World War at Wisconsin. There, Williams 
studied history under a number of renowned progressive scholars. Upon 
receiving his doctorate in 1950, he entered the historical profession allied 
with the progressive school's isolationism, its disdain for economic elites, its 
affinity with the "common people," and its moralistic present-mindedness. 
The progressive historians who predominated the field in the first 
decades of the twentieth-century, used their scholarship to address and 
influence the social struggles, inequalities, and reform movements of 
industrial America. Williams' progressivism, on the other hand, focused 
upon the events and issues of the post-Second World War era. He therefore 
turned his attention to what he regarded as the fundamental problems 
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associated with the United States' involvement in the Cold War. His 
revisionism evolved to address the "tragedy" of foreign policy in general and 
the shortcomings of American mass culture and society. In direct relation to 
the progressive school, Williams sought to use history in order to understand 
and help remedy what he considered where the most pressing issues facing 
the United States in the post-war era. 
Williams' kinship with the progressive school set him apart from the 
predominant intellectual and historiographical trends of the 1950s. For one 
thing, his disparaging analyses of foreign policy and his attacks upon 
corporate liberalism emerged at a time when most intellectuals jettisoned 
radical criticisms of American economic, political, and diplomatic institutions 
and became advocates for and defenders of New Deal liberalism and the 
United States' involvement in the Cold War. This move towards consensus 
and conservative liberalism resonated through the field of professional 
historical scholarship. Consensus historians rejected the assumptions of 
progressive historiography and often celebrated the virtues of American 
ideals. Moreover, several of the leading consensus historians constructed 
their work with a present-mindedness aimed at preserving, rather than 
changing, contemporary institutions. 
Although the critical theses that Williams developed during the 1950s 
emerged at odds with the decade's conservative intellectual trends, he shared 
with consensus historians a rejection of the progressive paradigm. Williams, 
like Daniel Boorstin and Louis Hartz, departed from progressive theses 
regarding the conflict-ridden nature of history, and instead focused upon the 
common attitudes and beliefs of the past. Williams located consensus in 
what he considered the predominant worldview of most Americans. And 
yet, while sharing the consensus approach, he established himself as an early 
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new left historian by condemning the United State's broad-based agreements 
and shared assumptions. 
As Bradford Perkins noted, Williams' scholarship "made a rather 
modest splash" during the 1950s, however, "within a few years it was 
definitely in the mainstream.Williams' iconoclastic present-mindedness, 
his criticisms of American foreign policy and his rejection of the political 
institutions, economic organizations, and social practices bred from corporate 
liberalism, informed the new left that emerged and developed during the 
1960s. For one thing, his scholarship helped instigate a wave of revisionism 
within the historical profession. Moreover, Williams' work gained stock 
amongst a young generation of students whose radical consciousness was 
shaped by the civil rights movement, the Cuban revolution, the Vietnam 
war, the rediscovery of poverty in the United States, and the conformity and 
alienation of a middle-class America. 
Overall, the first half of William Appleman Williams' career 
illustrates how a strand of new left radicalism developed through the 1950s 
and the 1960s. Most intellectual and cultural historians neglect Williams and 
the "Wisconsin School, " and instead, focus upon the "deradicalization" of 
the early post-war era. They contend that, in the years following the Second 
World War, in light of the horrors of Stalinism and Nazism, the threat of 
communism, and the apparent vitality of the United States" economic and 
political institutions, intellectuals rejected Marx and Beard, the old left and 
progressive historiography. This turn away from the Marxist and progressive 
traditions in turn gave rise to an era of consensus. Historians point out 
however that, despite the intellectual conservatism of the 1950s, the seeds of 
^Bradford Perkins, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy; Twenty-five Years After," p. 1. 
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new left radicalism were sown in the social and cultural criticisms of post-war 
culture and society. 
While such generalizations are helpful to understanding the broad 
patterns of post-war thought, they do not apply to Williams. He did not 
partake in the deradicalization of the 1950s. Rather, Williams inherited and 
sustained progressive radicalism through the initial post-war years. He did so 
by re-formulating a number of progressive ideas within the intellectal 
constructs of the 1950s. He modified facets of both progressive and consensus 
history and developed them into a radical synthesis. By the early 1960s, 
Williams' unique combination of these two seemingly incongruous schools 
of thought was characterized as new left. 
As such, Williams is a particularly relevant subject for the intellectual 
historian. His work not only provides insight into the origins of the new left, 
but also exemplifies what historians have concluded were "the essential 
continuities between the postwar years and the 1960s."2 
^Kichard Fells, i he Liberal Mind in A Conservative Age, p. 402. 
Bibliography 
Books: 
Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, The Use of the 
Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1970. 
Bacciocco, Edward J. The New Left in America: Reform to Revolution, 1956-
1970- Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974. 
Bates, Tom. Rads: The 1970 Bombing of the Army-Math Research Center at 
the University of Wisconsin and Its Aftermath. New York: Harper Collins, 
1992. 
Beard, Charles. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1913. 
. The Rise of American Civilization: Volumes I & II. New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1927. 
. The Idea of National Interest. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934. 
. The Open Door at Home. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934. 
.A Toreign Policy for America. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1940. 
Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the 
1950s. New York: Harper and Row, 1960. 
Berger, Henry, ed. A William Appleman Williams Reader. Chicago: Ivan R. 
Dee, 1992. 
Bernstein, Barton. Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American 
History. New York: Pantheon Books, 1968. 
. The Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration. Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1970. 
Boors tin, Daniel. The Genius of American Politics.. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1953. 
.The Americans: The Colonial Years. New York: Random House, 
1958. 
Buhle, Paul, ed. History and the New Left: Madison, Wisconsin, 1950-1970. 
Philadelphia; Temple University Press, 1990. 
95 
96 
Burnham, James. The Struggle for the World. New York: J. Day Co., 1947. 
Cohen, Mitchell and Dennis Hale, eds. The New Student Left: An Anthology. 
Boston; Beacon Press, 1966. 
Commager, Henry Steele. The American Mind: An Interpretation of 
American Thought and Character Since the 1890s. New Haven; Yale 
University Press, 1950. 
Cooney, Terry. The Rise of the New York Intellectuals: Partisan Review and 
Its Critics. Madison; The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986. 
Degler, Carl. Out of Our Past. New York: Harper and Row, 1959. 
Diggins, John Patrick. The Rise and Tall of the American Left. New York: 
W.W Norton and Co., 1992. 
Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Affluent Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1958. 
Gardner, Lloyd C. Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy. Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1965. 
. Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Toreign Policy, 
1941-1949. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970. 
, ed. Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of 
William Appleman Williams. Corvallis: Oregon State University 
Press, 1986. 
Gilbert, James. Writers and Partisans. New York: Wiley Co., 1968. 
Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. New York: Bantam 
Books, 1987. 
Goldberg, Harvey, ed. American Radicals: Some Problems and Personalities. 
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957. 
Graebner, Norman. The Age of Doubt: American Thought and Culture in the 
1940s. Boston: T way ne Publishers, 1991. 
Handlin, Oscar. The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that 
Made the American People. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1951. 
97 
Harrington, Michael. The Other America: Poverty in the United States. New 
York: Macmillan Press, 1962. 
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in American Political Thought. New 
York; Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1955. 
Hodgson, Godfrey. America In Our Time: From World War II to Nixon, 
What Happened and Why. New York: Vintage Books, 1976. 
Hofstadter, Richard. The American Political Tradition and the Men Who 
Made It. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Co., 1948. 
. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR. New York: Vintage Books, 
1955. 
Horowitz, David. The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Policy in 
the Cold War. New York; Hall and Wang, 1965-
Isserman, Maurice. If I Had a Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the 
Birth of the New Left. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987. 
Kennan, George. American Diplomacy: 1900-1950. Chicago; The University of 
Chicago Press, 1951. 
. Memoirs: Volume 1. Boston: Little and Brown Co., 1967. 
Lafeber, Walter. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 
1880-1898. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963. 
. America, Russia, and the Cold War. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1967. 
Lemisch, Jesse. On Active Service in War and Peace: Politics and Ideology in 
the American Historical Profession. Toronto; New Hogtown Press, 1975. 
Leuchtenburg, William. Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-
1940. New York; Harper and Row, 1963. 
Lippman, Walter. The Cold War. New York: Harper and Row Co., 1947. 
Lipset, Seymour. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. New York: 
Doubleday, 1959. 
MacDonald, Dwight. Against the American Grain. New York: Random 
House, 1952. 
98 
Maddox, Robert J. The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1973. 
Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. New York; Vintage Books, 1955. 
. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 
Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. 
Matusow, Allen J. The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 
1960s. New York: Harper and Row, 1984. 
May, Larry, ed.. Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of the Cold 
War. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989. 
McCormick, Thomas J. China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 
1893-1901. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967. 
Menash, Louis and Ronald Radosh, eds. Teach-ins: U.S.A., Reports, Opinions, 
Documents. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 
Mills, C. Wright. White Collar. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951. 
Mitchell, Broadus. Alexander Hamilton: Youth to Maturity, 1755-1788. New 
York: Macmillan, 1957. 
Morgan, Edmund S. The Puritan Dillema: The Story of John Winthrop. 
Boston: Little Brown, 1958. 
Ne vins, Allan. Study in Power: John D. Rockefeller. New York: Scribner, 
1953. 
Noble, David. The End of American History: Democracy, Capitalism, and the 
Metaphor of Two Worlds in Anglo-American Historical Writing, 1880-1980. 
Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1965. 
. The Progressive Mind: 1890-1917. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971. 
. Historians Against History: The Frontier Thesis and the National 
Covenant in American Historical Writing since 1830. Minneapolis: 
The University of Minnesota Press, 1985. 
Parrington, Vernon. Main Currents in American Thought: Volumes I & 11. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1927. 
99 
Pells, Richard. The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American 
Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s. Middletown: Wesley an University Press, 
1985. 
Potter, David. People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American 
Character. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954. 
Riesman, David. The Lonely Crowd. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. 
Robinson, James Harvey. The New History: Essays Illustrating the Modern 
Historical Outlook. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1912. 
Sale, Kirkpatrick. SDS. New York: Random House, 1973. 
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949. 
. The Crises of the Old Order. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957. 
Siracusa, Joesph. New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The 
American Revisionists. Port Washington; Kennikat Press, 1973. 
Tucker, Robert. The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1971. 
Unger, Irwin. The Movement: The History of the American New Left: 1959-
1972. New York: Dodd and Mead, 1974. 
Washburn, Wilcomb. The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's 
Rebellion in Virginia. Chapel Hill, 1957. 
White, Morton. Social Thought in America. New York: Viking Press, 1949. 
Whitfield, Stephen J. The Culture of the Cold War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991. 
Why te, William. The Organization Man. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956. 
Williams, William Appleman. Russian-American Relations. New York: 
Rinehart, 1952. 
, ed. The Shaping of American Diplomacy: Readings and Documents 
in American Foreign Relations, 1750-1955. Chicago: Rand McNally 
and Co., 1956. 
100 
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. Cleveland: The World 
Publishing Co., 1959. 
.. The United States, Cuba, and Castro. New York; Monthly Review 
Press, 1962. 
_. The Great Evasion: An Essay on the Contemporary Relevance of Karl 
Marx and on the Wisdom of Admitting the Heretic into the Dialogue 
about America's Future. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. 
The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth 
and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society. New 
York; Random House, 1969. 
. Some Presidents: Wilson to Nixon. New York; New York Review, 
1972. 
_. History as a Way of Learning, New York; New Viewpoints, 1974. 
_. America Confronts a Revolutionary World: 1776-1976. New York: 
Morrow, 1976. 
_. Americans in A Changing World: A History of the United States in 
the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper and Row, 1978. 
.. Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of 
America's Predicament Along with a Tew Thoughts about an 
Alternative. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. 
Articles 
Higham, John. "The Cult of the American Consensus,"Commentary, XXVII 
(February 1959). 
Kennan, George. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXV, No. 
4 (July 1947). 
Lasch, Christopher. "The Cold War Revisited and Revisioned," New York 
Times Magazine (January 14, 1968). 
."William Appleman Williams On American History," Marxist 
Perspectives, 3 (Fall 1978). 
Melanson, Richard. "The Social and Political Thought of William Appleman 
Williams," Western Political Quarterly, 31 (Fall 1978). 
101 
Read, Conyers. "The Social Responsibilities of the Historian," American 
Historical Review, LV (January 1950)-
Simpson, Allen. "How Democratic Was Roger Williams," William and Mary 
Quarterly, XIII (January 1956). 
Solway, Clifford. "Turning History Upside Down: A Radical Neo-Marxian 
Interpretation of America's Past has been Educating Many of the Young to 
New Historical Insights and Now is Poised to Infiltrate the Textbooks of the 
Seventies," Saturday Review (June 20, 1970). 
Turner, Frederick Jackson. "The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History," American Historical Association, Annual Report for the Year 1893 
(Washington, 1894). 
Unger, Irwin. "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in 
United States Historiography," American Historical Review, LXXII (July 1967). 
Williams, William Appleman. "Brooks Adams and American 
Expansionism," New England Quarterly, XXV (June 1952). 
. "Moscow Peace Drive: Victory for Containment?," The Nation, 177 
(July 11, 1953). 
. 'The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s," Science and Society, XVIII 
(Winter 1954). 
. "Cold War Perspectives — A Historical Fable, " The Nation, 180 (May 
13,1955). 
. "The Historical Romance of Senator Neuberger's Election," Oregon 
Historical Quarterly, LVI (June 1955). 
. "The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy," Pacific Historical 
Review, XXIV (November 1955). 
. "Babbit's New Fables," The Nation, 182 (January 7, 1956). 
. "Great Boomerang: The Irony of Containment," The Nation, 182 (May 
5, 1956). 
. "On the Restoration of Brooks Adams," Science and Society, XX 
(Summer 1956). 
. "Reflections on the Historiography of American Entry into World 
War I," Oregon Historical Quarterly, LVII (September 1956). 
102 
. "A Note on Charles Austin Beard's Search for a General Theory of 
Causation," American Historical Review, LXII (October 1956). 
. "Taxing for Peace," The Nation, 184 (January 19, 1957). 
. "China and Japan: A Challenge and A Choice of the Nineteen 
Twenties," Pacific Historical Review, XXVI (August 1957). 
. "Latin America: Laboratory of American Foreign Policy in the 1920s," 
Inter-American Affairs, 11 (Autumn 1957). 
. "The Age of Mercantilism: An Interpretation of the American 
Political Economy, 1763-1828," The William and Mary Quarterly, XV 
(October 1958). 
. "A Note on American Foreign Policy in Europe in the 1920s," Science 
and Society, XVII (Winter 1958). 
. "The American Century, 1941-1957," The Nation, 188 (February 21, 
1959). 
Chapters From Compiled Works 
Bernstein, Barton. "The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of 
Liberal Reform," in Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American 
History, ed. by Barton Bernstein. New York: Pantheon Books, 1968. 
. "America in War and Peace: The Test of Liberalism," in Towards a 
New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History, ed. by Barton 
Bernstein. New York: Pantheon Books, 1968. 
Gutman, Herbert. "Learning About History," in History and the New Left: 
Madison Wisconsin, 1950-1970, ed. by Paul Buhle. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1990. 
Noble, David. "William Appleman Williams and the Crises of Public 
History," in Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of 
William Appleman Williams, ed. by Lloyd C. Gardner. Corvallis: Oregon 
State University Press, 1986. 
. "The Reconstruction of Progress: Charles Beard, Richard Hofstadter, 
and Postwar Political Thought," in Recasting America: Culture and 
Politics in the Age of the Cold War, ed. by Larry May. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1989 
103 
Robbins, William G. "Doing History is Best of All. No Regrets," in 
Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William 
Appleman Williams, ed. by Lloyd C. Gardner. Corvallis: Oregon State 
University Press, 1986. 
Wiley, Peter. "Radicalized History," in History and the New Left: Madison, 
Wisconsin, 1950-1970, ed. by Paul Buhle. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1990. 
Williams, William A. "Charles Beard; The Intellectual as Tory-Radical," in 
American Radicals: Some Problems and Personalities, ed. by Harvey 
Goldberg. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957. 
. "My Life in Madison," in History and the New Left: Madison, 
Wisconsin, 1950-1970, ed. by Paul Buhle. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1990. 
Book Reviews 
Aptheker, Herbert. "American Development and Ruling Class Ideology," 
Studies on the Left, 3 (January 1963). Review of The Contours of American 
HIistory by William Appleman Williams. 
Dulles, Foster Rhea. "Review of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy," 
American Historical Review (July 1959). 
Genovese, Eugene. "William Appleman Williams on Marx and America," 
Studies on the Left, VI (Jan.-Feb. 1966) Review of The Great Evasion by 
William Appleman Williams. 
Handlin, Oscar. "Review of The Contours of American History, Mississippi 
Historical Review, XLVIII (March 4, 1962). 
Lukacs, John. "Review of Empire as a Way of Life," New Republic, 31 (Oct. 11, 
1980). 
Time Magazine. "Loaded History: Review of The Contours of American 
History," Time, LXXVII, No. 1 (July 7, 1961). 
Other 
Flint, Peter B. "William Appleman Williams Dies; Gadfly of Foreign Policy 
Was 68," The New York Times, Thursday, March 8, 1990. 
Wallace, Mike. "An Interview with William Appleman Williams," Radical 
Historical Review, 22 (Winter 1979-1980). 
104 
Williams, William Appleman, "Raymond Robbins and Russian-American 
Relations: 1917-1938," Phd. Dissertation (The University of Wisconsin, 1950). 
